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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MISSOURI’S SACRIFICIAL LAMB: POLITICAL PARTY
CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN
MISSOURI REPUBLICAN PARTY V. LAMB

He was led like a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is
silent, so he did not open his mouth.1

I. INTRODUCTION
The state of Missouri most likely did not intend to lead its statewide party
organizations to the slaughter, but its campaign finance statute created a
similar effect to that described in the Bible. On the altar of reform, the state of
Missouri tried to silence its political parties by significantly limiting what they
could contribute to their candidates in a campaign for elective office. With the
First Amendment in hand, the Eighth Circuit prevented Missouri’s sacrifice.
Relying partly on the Supreme Court’s seminal campaign finance reform case,
Buckley v. Valeo,2 the Eighth Circuit found Missouri’s limits on parties
unconstitutional in Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb.3
Since Buckley, courts have struggled mightily with its application, finding
it difficult to determine the constitutionality of subsequent campaign finance
reforms passed by both Congress and the states.4 The primary reason for this
is that in Buckley, the Supreme Court decided that any limitation of campaign
spending triggers First Amendment scrutiny because money is required for
political communication; thus, a limitation on its use in campaigns amounts to
a limitation on political speech. The most criticized aspect of the Court’s
extensive decision in Buckley was the constitutionally significant distinction it
made between campaign contributions,5 which could be limited under the First

1. Isaiah 53:7b.
2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3. 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000), application for stay denied sub nom. Nixon v. Missouri
Republican Party, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000) [hereinafter Lamb III]. As of publication of this Note,
Missouri’s petition for writ of certiorari was pending. See Petitions for Writ of Certiorari Pending
at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/reports/cert. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of Missouri’s
petition and the Missouri Republican Party’s response.
4. Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance, the Parties and the Court: A Comment on
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Elections Commission, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 91, 92 (1997) [hereinafter Briffault, Comment].
5. A contribution is essentially a gift. The Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA)
provides that a person may contribute up to $20,000 per year to the national committees of a
925
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Amendment in order to prevent corruption, and independent campaign
expenditures,6 which could not be limited, due to the absence of the same
corruption risk.7 Using these two labels, the Supreme Court invalidated a large
portion of the Federal Elections and Campaign Act (FECA),8 which
significantly weakened its comprehensive scheme and left standing only
restrictions on individual and group contributions.9
These labels continue to govern the Supreme Court’s campaign finance
reform jurisprudence today, as demonstrated by a series of Supreme Court
cases decided after Buckley. In most of the cases since Buckley, the Court has
been confronted only with independent expenditures and has found the limits
unconstitutional. Last year, however, the Court upheld Missouri’s limits on
contributions in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (Shrink II).10
The Supreme Court recently reconsidered a challenge to the
constitutionality of coordinated expenditures11—a middle category between
independent expenditures and contributions that the FECA created solely for
political parties.12 In 1996, the Court decided Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. Federal Elections Commission (Colorado Republican
I) and remanded the portion of the case dealing with coordinated
expenditures.13 It was in this case that the Court received its first opportunity
to consider campaign finance reform in the party-candidate context. As it
prepares to rule on this issue again, perhaps the Court will be influenced by the
Eighth Circuit’s ground-breaking decision in Missouri Republican Party v.

political party and up to $5000 per year to state party committees for activities in connection with
federal elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(1)(B)-(C) (1994).
6. Independent expenditures are expenditures not in cooperation, consultation or concert
with a candidate. Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 94. Some questions exist as to whether a
political party can make truly independent expenditures. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Beck, at
4 n.2, Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2000) (No. 00191), available at 2000 WL 1792974.
7. Id. at 98.
8. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994).
9. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6-8, 20-21.
10. 528 U.S. 377, 384-85 [hereinafter Shrink II].
11. FECA allows political parties to make limited coordinated expenditures in connection
with a campaign. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1994).
12. On February 28, 2000, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000) [hereinafter Colorado Republican II], a case in which, on remand
from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit declared unconstitutional a provision of FECA which
limited coordinated spending (defined as a contribution by the FEC) between a political party and
a candidate. The Court’s opinion will likely be issued by the end of June of 2001. U.S. High
Court Considers Party Spending Limits, REUTERS, available at http://news.findlaw.com/
legalnews/s/20010228/courtpolitics.html.
13. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604,
625 (1996).
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Lamb. Table 1 illustrates the evolution of the Supreme Court’s campaign
finance jurisprudence with respect to the type of spending being regulated.
Table 1: Supreme Court Holdings on Campaign Spending Limits Compared to
The Eighth Circuit’s Holding in Lamb
Limits on:

Independent
Expenditures

Coordinated
Expenditures

Contributions

Buckley v. Valeo (1976)

Unconstitutional

Constitutional

Constitutional

California Medical Association v.
14

FEC (1981)

FEC v. Nat’l Conservative
15

Political Action Comm: (1986)
Colorado Republican Fed.

Campaign Comm. v. FEC (1996)

Unconstitutional

Unconstitutional

Unconstitutional

Remanded

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t

Constitutional

16

PAC (2000)

Missouri Republican Party v.

Unconstitutional

Lamb (8th Cir. 2000)
FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed.

To Be

Campaign Comm. (2001)

Determined

14. 453 U.S. 182 (1981) [hereinafter CalMed]. In CalMed, four members of the Court
expressed the view that nothing in FECA restricts the amount that a political action committee
(PAC) can independently expend to advocate political views. However, these members of the
Court were not persuaded by the California Medical Association’s argument that its “speech by
proxy” through its own PAC was entitled to full First Amendment protection. Id. at 195-96.
Consequently, these members of the Court maintained that FECA could constitutionally restrict
the amount an association can contribute to its PAC. Id. at 184.
15. 470 U.S. 480 (1984) [hereinafter NCPAC]. In NCPAC, the Court again found that a
limitation on a political committee’s independent expenditures in support of a candidate were
unconstitutional absent an indication that such expenditures have a tendency to corrupt or to give
the appearance of corruption. Id. at 497-98.
16. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). In Shrink II, the Court found Missouri’s limits on individual
contributions constitutional, concluding that the state statute was not void for lack of evidence
where the legitimacy of the state’s interest was so well-accepted in the Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence. Id. at 384. Moreover, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s assumption that
Buckley set a minimum constitutional threshold for contribution limits, finding that Missouri’s
limits were not too low to allow for effective political advocacy. Id. at 396.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

928

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:925

The Eighth Circuit has considered more campaign finance reform cases
than any other circuit.17 Consistently finding the challenged reforms
unconstitutional, the Eighth Circuit has earned a reputation for placing a high
evidentiary burden on the state before allowing any abridgement of the First
Amendment free speech rights associated with campaign spending.18
In Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb (Lamb III), the Eighth Circuit
considered the issue of contributions made by political parties to candidates, an
issue upon which the Supreme Court has never directly ruled. In finding
Missouri’s limit on the amount parties can contribute to candidates
unconstitutional, the court once again put itself at the forefront of a debate
about campaign finance reform that has been churning in our nation’s
legislatures, courts and halls of academia for the past three decades.19 This
debate may come to a head in the current Supreme Court term, when the Court
will directly consider the party-candidate relationship in the context of
campaign finance reform.20
Lamb III is a product of comprehensive legislation passed by the Missouri
Legislature in 1994.21 Using FECA as a model, the bill limited, among other
17. See, e.g., Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v.
Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995); Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995); Russell v.
Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998); Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th
Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Shrink I].
18. See D. Bruce LaPierre, Raising a New First Amendment Hurdle for Campaign Finance
“Reform,” 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 217 (1998) (explaining that the ACLU of Eastern Missouri has
successfully encouraged the Eighth Circuit to adopt a “real harm” standard when considering
Missouri’s, and other states’, justifications for various campaign finance reforms) [hereinafter
LaPierre, First Amendment Hurdle]. See also Matthew S. Criscimagna, Note, The Narrow
Application of Buckley v. Valeo: Is Campaign Finance Reform Possible in the Eighth Circuit?,
64 MO. L. REV. 437 (1999) (discussing the high standard placed on state campaign finance
regulations by the Eighth Circuit).
19. See, e.g., Politicians For Rent, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997, at 23; Jill Abramson, The
Nation: Following the Money; For McCain, Now’s the Time. But Bush?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2001, at 16; Robert Dreyfuss, Harder Than Soft Money, AM. PROSPECT, Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 30;
Linda Greenhouse, Court Agrees to Review Restrictions on Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2000,
at A20; Josh Goldstein, Campaign Financing Bill Moving Forward With McCain at Helm,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 28, 2001; FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS
AND REALITIES (1992) [hereinafter SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE]. In addition, at least
five different law reviews have hosted symposiums on campaign finance reform and other
election law issues in the last two years. Symposium, Money, Politics, and Equality, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1603 (1999), Symposium, The Law and Economics of Elections, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533
(1999); A Symposium: The Legal and Political Implications of Buckley v. Valeo, 33 AKRON L.
REV. 1 (1999); Symposium: Law and Political Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 593 (2000);
Symposium, Election Law, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2000).
20. The Court is expected to issue its Colorado Republican II opinion by the end of June of
2001. See supra note 12. For a discussion of the oral arguments, see infra Part II.C.
21. Appellee’s Brief at 3, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir.
2000) (No. 00-2686).
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things, the amount of cash and in-kind support a political party could
contribute to one of its candidates.22 After violating the limits in 1998, the
Missouri Republican Party (the Party) challenged them on constitutional
grounds.23 The district court awarded summary judgment to the state, basing
its decision on Shrink II’s holding that limits on contributions are
presumptively constitutional.24 The Eighth Circuit, on appeal, also fit the
Party’s spending into the contribution category, but announced that the identity
of the contributor distinguished Lamb III from Shrink II in a crucial way.25
Stressing the differences between an individual contribution and a party
contribution, the court found a weightier free speech right in the party context,
which enabled it to impose the higher evidentiary burden for which it has
become known.26 Finding that the state failed to meet the burden necessary to
justify this abridgement of the Party’s speech and associational rights, the court
held Missouri’s limits on a party’s cash and in-kind contributions constituted a
violation of the First Amendment.27
This Note discusses both the political and constitutional issues that were at
stake in deciding Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb. After describing the
political and legal landscape of campaign finance reform, including the
McCain-Feingold legislative effort and Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit
precedent in Part II, it discusses the facts and holding of the instant case in Part
III. Part III examines the arguments made in the case, both at the district court
level, and then by the majority and dissent at the circuit court level. In Part IV,
this Note analyzes these arguments, including a discussion of the contribution
expenditure distinction and of the past and present role of the American
political party in electoral politics. This Note argues that the decision made by
the Eighth Circuit was the correct one. The district court’s approach, which
allowed the type or category of spending to be dispositive, with no regard
given to the identity of the contributor, failed to account for political realities
and for the important role of the political party28 in every state and in America
22. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1162 (E.D. Mo. 1999)
[hereinafter Lamb I].
23. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
Lamb III].
24. Lamb I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
25. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1072.
26. Id. at 1072.
27. Id. at 1074.
28. FECA defines a political party as “an association, committee or organization which
nominates a candidate for election to any Federal office whose name appears on the election
ballot as the candidate of such association, committee, or organization.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(16)
(1994).
The strength of America’s major political parties appears to be an unsettled debate.
Most would agree with a number of political scientists who recently observed that the “two major
political parties and their legislative campaign committees (LCCs) are among the most important
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as a whole. The recent election highlighted that important role in a manner
few of us could have anticipated. Although the U.S. Constitution does not
specifically mention political parties, the Eighth Circuit did not err in giving
parties special accord. Its conclusion that political party contribution limits
should be analyzed differently than individual contribution limits, because of
the unique relationship between parties and candidates and the low risk of
corruption, was proper. In addition to the constitutional issue, this Note will
show that allowing the parties to contribute freely to their candidates enhances
the accountability that voters can have over elected officials and the party they
support. This creates a healthy democracy, and, by removing the need for
politicians to seek contributions from more narrow, less accountable entities
such as individuals and PACs, actually removes some of the potential for
corruption that exists where political party contribution limits are in place.
II. THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A.

Where We Are: McCain-Feingold and “The Corruption of American
Politics”

In 1999, well-known political journalist Elizabeth Drew wrote a book
entitled The Corruption of American Politics: What Went Wrong and Why.29
Decrying the current state of affairs with mostly anecdotal evidence, Drew
reflected many people’s belief that “the money culture” has deeply and perhaps
mortally affected American politics.30 Among money’s pernicious effects,
Drew listed the following: it influences the issues raised and their outcome,
distracts congressional members, directs career choices and subverts values.31
She wrote: “The culture of money dominates Washington as never before;
money now rivals or even exceeds power as the preeminent goal.”32 While
there is disagreement over what should be done about this situation, few would
players in our electoral landscape.” Brief of Amici Curiae Beck, at 3-4, Federal Election
Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2000) (No. 00-191), available at 2000
WL 1792974. In a comparative sense, however, one might conclude that America’s parties are
far weaker than they could be. Politicians for Rent, supra note 19, at 23 (claiming that America
is unique in that political parties play a relatively small role in financing campaigns, noting that
most candidates raise the money themselves).
29. ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT WRONG
AND WHY (1999).
30. Id. at 61.
31. Id. at 61-65. Interestingly, each party itself contributes to the perception that the other is
corrupt by charging that the other party is “in the pockets” of certain special interests, such as trial
lawyers or tobacco. By making such charges, the parties are contributing to the public perception
that contributions to political parties can corrupt members of Congress. Brief of Amici Curiae
Beck, at 18, Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2001) (No.
00-191), available at 2000 WL 1792974.
32. DREW, supra note 29, at 61.
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argue with Drew’s contention that something is seriously wrong with the
campaign finance system she blames for these woes.33 As more policy-makers
have realized the direness of the situation, the impetus for campaign finance
reform has grown such that one can be fairly certain that the newly elected
107th Congress will produce a campaign finance reform bill. The question
becomes: Will it meaningfully address the problems in a constitutional
manner? The most well-known of the reform proposals is, of course, the
McCain-Feingold bill, with its crusading and controversial Republican
sponsor, Arizona Senator John McCain. Aided by a recent election filled with
abnormalities, Senator McCain has succeeded in elevating the issue of
campaign and election reform to the top of the legislative agenda.34 In fact, his
bill, which had three co-sponsors last year, had just been passed in the
Senate—by a comfortable 59 to 41 margin—when this Note went to
publication.35 Before examining the merits of the different legislative
proposals being made and their bearing on the party-candidate relationship,
one must understand the pressures that bear on this endeavor, making
meaningful campaign finance reform an extremely difficult prospect.
The debate over campaign finance reform centers around two goals and
two pressures, the collective sums of which appear to be irreconcilable. The
reformers’ goals are two-fold: (1) to create a neater and tidier political culture
void of corruption or pollution; and (2) to create a greater measure of political
equality, thus leveling the political playing field.36 Skeptics have denounced
both of these goals as impossible, due to the following pressures: (1) the
pressure exerted by money itself, which will almost certainly remain a constant
means of influencing elections; and (2) the pressure exerted by the First
Amendment, the presence of which seriously hampers the political equality
rationale for reform. The first pressure is a function of the fact that political
money will seek an outlet. The hope that reform will lessen the amount of
money spent on American elections is simply untenable in a capitalistic
country with as much wealth as ours and with a constitutional guarantee of the
33. See John Copeland Nagle, Corruption, Pollution and Politics: The Corruption of
American Politics: What Went Wrong and Why, 110 YALE L.J. 293, 305 (2000) (reviewing
DREW, supra note 29).
34. See Helen Dewar, McCain to Plow Ahead on Campaign Finance Reform; Push for Bill
is a Challenge to Bush, Congress, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2001, at A2; Amy Keller & John
Bresnahan, McCain Gets Date Certain on Reform Bill But Reformers Worry New Panel May
Delay Action on Campaign Finance Reform, ROLL CALL, Jan. 29, 2001.
35. Alison Mitchell, Campaign Finance Bill Passes in Senate, 59-41; House Vows a Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001 at A-1. See also S.27, Bill Summary and Status for 107th Congress, at
http://Thomas.loc.gov [hereinafter S.27].
36. See, e.g., E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Richard L. Hasen, Introduction: Money, Politics, and
Equality, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1603, 1604 (1999). In this introduction of a symposium about the
three issues identified in the title, Professor Rosenkranz, the Executive Director of the Brennan
Center for Justice at New York University, defended the political equality rationale.
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right to spend that money however one wants. While few people are
comfortable with the amount of money that is currently being spent on
campaigns,37 it is unrealistic to believe that the amount can somehow be
dammed. This phenomenon caused one critic to exclaim: “The history of
‘campaign finance reform’ is that every limit inspires new evasions.”38
Academics have given various labels to such evasions including “unintended
consequences,”39 “undemocratic consequences”40 and “substitution effects.”41
Indeed, the pressure exerted by the never-ending flow of money causes even
those who sympathize with reform efforts to conclude that a bill like McCainFeingold, which focuses on soft money,42 would have little effect on the real

37. More than one billion dollars was spent on last year’s Presidential campaign alone.
Editorial, Campaign Finance, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 2, 2001, at 2. National
Public Radio recently reported that the two parties together raised and spent more than $750
million in hard money in the last election cycle. In a brief interview, Fred Wertheimer, President
of Democracy 21, a pro-reform group, argued that a sum this large shows to what degree conduit
corruption through a party is possible in the absence of limits on coordinated expenditures. Jan
Baran, the lawyer who recently argued on behalf of the Colorado Republican Party before the
Supreme Court countered that “[i]t is a fact of life that reaching millions of voters who are busy
and are not particularly attentive to political messages is a costly and complicated process. And
it’s going to cost a lot of money.” Interview on National Public Radio, Morning Edition (Feb. 28,
2001).
38. Robert J. Samuelson, Editorial, Campaign Finance Hysteria, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1999,
at A29.
39. William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 335, 343-45 (2000). Professor Marshall argues that the law of unintended consequences has
particular force in this arena because the pressure of money on the system is inevitable, and
political money will seek an outlet. He lists a number of adverse unintended consequences
including: funds diverted from candidates to special interest groups; issue advocacy, which
restricts a candidate’s control over her campaign; massive increases in the amount of time
candidates must spend raising money; and a practice called “bundling,” whereby well-connected
persons amass hard money from a number of contributors and present it to the candidate in one
package. Id.
40. Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1072 (1996) [hereinafter Smith, Faulty Assumptions].
Professor Smith lists the following as undemocratic consequences of campaign finance reform: it
entrenches the status quo, making it more difficult for challengers; it makes the electoral system
less responsive to public opinion; it enhances the power of a select group of elites; it favors
independently wealthy candidates; and it limits opportunities for grassroots political activity. Id.
41. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 325
(1998) [hereinafter Sullivan, Against Reform]. Professor Sullivan’s substitution effects parallel
the “consequences” listed by Professors Marshall and Smith. For example, she lists issue
advocacy, which is funded by independent expenditures, and soft money as two of the nonaccountable effects of spending limits. Id. at 325.
42. FECA allows individuals or groups to contribute unlimited amounts of “soft money” to
political parties on grassroots, party-building activities such as producing buttons, bumper
stickers, brochures, posters and holding voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431(8)(B)(x-xii), 9(B)(xiii-ix) (1994). In contrast, the term “hard money” has come to
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world because the $400 million spent on soft money contributions would
simply be spent in other ways to influence electoral politics.43 Another of the
“unintended consequences” caused by a spending limit-oriented reform agenda
is that it makes it more difficult for challengers to mount effective campaigns
against well-entrenched incumbents. This problem hints at the inevitable
conflict of interest that occurs when elected officials are put in charge of
enacting reforms that affect their own prospects for re-election.44
While the effects of spending limits are manifold, perhaps the biggest
obstacle to campaign finance reform and political equality in America is the
First Amendment. One commentator recently wrote that “[a]s long as we have
the First Amendment, the effort to regulate elections—under the guise of
‘campaign finance reform’—is futile, self-defeating, and undesirable.”45
Indeed, the First Amendment guarantee of free political speech would appear
to be an insurmountable obstacle to creating effective limits on campaign
spending. This is so because regardless of how much hard or soft money
contributions are limited, the First Amendment will not allow the limitation of
a person or group’s independent spending.46 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that no matter how hard the reformers try to enact campaign finance reform,
the result will not be to their liking because only a certain fraction of the world
of political money can come under Congress’s hand. This fact caused Bradley
A. Smith, the current Commissioner of the Federal Elections Commission, to
state what is obvious to many but not all. He stated that “[t]he First
Amendment does not . . . promise a neat and tidy system of elections.”47
characterize the type of spending that comes under FECA limits, such as contributions and
coordinated expenditures. Even though soft money is the focus of the current legislative debate,
this Note will limit its analysis to limits on hard money contributions by parties to candidates.
43. Robert Dreyfuss, Reforming Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 18, 2000, at 26.
44. Marshall, supra note 39, at 336. See also Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform:
Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1278-79 (1994)
(suggesting that a “premise of distrust” is appropriate when looking at campaign finance reform
due to the conflict of interest) [hereinafter BeVier, Specious Arguments].
45. Samuelson, supra note 38, at A29.
46. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-49 (1976). Independent advocacy in the form of
expenditures, explained the Buckley Court, does not propose a danger of corruption because it is
carried out independently of the candidate and his or her campaign. The Court noted that such
expenditures may provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and may even prove
counterproductive. The Court added that the absence of prearrangement and coordination of an
expenditure with the candidate alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro
quo for improper commitments from the candidate. Having made this observation, the Court
concluded that the independent expenditure limitation of the FECA impermissibly burdened the
First Amendment. Id. at 46-48.
47. Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 40, at 1090. Against the wishes of many
reformers, Smith, a libertarian law professor and opinion leader for those favoring de-regulation
of campaign finance laws, was installed as the FEC commissioner last year. It is both ironic and
interesting that the individual most responsible for enforcing campaign finance laws believes
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Campaign finance reformers focusing on the untidiness of the process have
responded with an ever-growing web of regulation, the undemocratic result of
which, he claimed, has been an even more disconnected and cynical American
public.48 Political equality proponents, nevertheless, counter that efforts to
level the playing field and make the system more fair through spending limits
and public funding are the remedy for such disconnectedness. Everyone
agrees that political equality is a praiseworthy ideal and worth shooting for;
however, it would seem that the best means for attaining it, due to the
existence of the First Amendment, are the very opposite means of those
favored by limit-oriented reformers. This is so because the removal of limits,
coupled with aggressive disclosure, would stem the tide of political money
being spent outside of the accountable fraction of the world of political
money.49
In light of these pressures, one must ask how the 107th Congress should
address what so many perceive to be the cause of the “corruption of American
politics,”—the current campaign finance system. One can only hope that
Congress will not create more “undemocratic consequences” by simply adding
to the web of regulation that already exists,50 but rather, that the structures of
our Constitution, as well as the realities of our political and economic life, will
inform its debate. When this Note was published, debate in the Senate had just
been completed on McCain-Feingold-Cochran51 and three rival plans, in
addition to amendments.52 At issue were primarily soft money limits, in
addition to hard money contribution limits, issue advocacy,53 and a new

those laws should be repealed. The main point of his many writings is that people have a basic
right to unfettered political speech. Since his appointment, Smith has succeeded in relaxing some
of the rules, arguably making an already weak regulatory organization even weaker. Eliza
Newlin Carney, The Anti-Reformers, THE NAT’L J., Feb. 17, 2001, at 474-75.
48. Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 40, at 1090.
49. Professor Sullivan argues in another article that strong and immediate disclosure
requirements coupled with the law of diminishing marginal returns is the only real answer to the
campaign finance reform conundrum. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of
Speech: A Reply to Frank Askin, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1998). She concluded that
“[a]s in other areas, such as the regulation of hate speech and pornography, there are limits to how
far the regulation of speech can be made to do the work of altering underlying problems of
material inequality.” Id.
50. See Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 40, at 1090.
51. Influential Mississippi Republican Senator Thad Cochran’s name was recently added to
the title.
52. Keller & Bresnahan, supra note 34. See also Senate Opening Triggers Campaign
Finance Reform Battle, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Jan. 24, 2001.
53. Issue advocacy is the title given to the practice of running television advertisements that
do not expressly “advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Buckley, 424
U.S. at 44. Because the Supreme Court, in Buckley, limited the scope of FECA regulation to
express advocacy, “issue advocacy” lacking certain magic words such as “vote for” or “vote
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disclosure regime.54 As passed by the Senate, the McCain-Feingold bill would
not further the cause of political party involvement in campaign spending. In
fact, arguably the foremost targets of the bill are the political parties.55 The
bill’s provisions not only ban all soft money donations to political parties and
certain types of issue advocacy, they also only marginally increase the twentyfive-year-old limits on political party hard money contributions and
coordinated expenditures.56 The debates have already demonstrated that one
challenge for Congress will be to draft a bill that can withstand First
Amendment scrutiny. Another challenge will be to draft a bill that adequately
takes into account political and legal realities, including the important role that
political parties can and should play in the conduct of elections and the
guarantees of the First Amendment.

against” has become an important means by which parties, political action committees, and
corporations support candidates.
54. See Dewar, supra note 34, at A2; S.27, supra note 35. Nebraska Senator Chuck Hagel’s
bill, S.22, entitled the Open and Accountable Campaign Financing Act of 2001, focused on
revised (monthly) reporting requirements and includes increased contribution limits and a
$60,000 per year limit on soft money contributions. See S.22, Bill Summary and Status for the
107th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.gov. Senator McCain claims that his two top priorities,
which he believes would remove ninety percent of the problem, are first, to ban soft money and
second, to address independent campaigns and issue advocacy by which radical groups launch
attack advertisements. Interview on CNBC, Tim Russert (Feb. 10, 2001). Arguably, a ban on
issue advocacy would violate the First Amendment. Editorial, A Flinch on Campaign Finance,
WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2001, at A-32.
55. Richard Loving, A Spoiler’s Crusade: Senator John McCain and “The System”, NAT’L
REV., Feb. 19, 2001, at 30-32. The author of this cover story described McCain as an anti-party
renegade whose anti-party bill, if passed, would be subject to numerous court challenges. He
called campaign finance reform “an adjustment to a set of arcane rules that never should have
been written in the first place and that no one outside of the directly affected interests feels
compelled to pay attention to, let alone understand . . . as a matter of McCain’s own stated goals,
it is a contradiction, a check on exactly the active citizenship he seeks to promote.”
Conservative columnist George Will recently stated the premise of McCain-Feingold is
that “[s]omething is inherently corrupt about the relationship between political parties and
candidates.” George Will, ‘Feeble Councils’ Want Bush to Fumble on First Amendment, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 5, 2001, at C-19. Senator Mitch McConnell, on the day McCainFeingold was passed, pronounced the following malediction on the final bill: “What we have
done here, in an effort to get the money out of politics, is to get the parties out of politics . . .
welcome to the brave new world, where the voices of the parties are quieted, the voices of the
billionaires are enhanced, the voices of the newspapers are enhanced.” See Mitchell, supra note
35, at A-1.
56. S.27, supra note 35. See also Mitchell, supra note 35, at A-1. The limits on how much
an individual can give to a federal candidate would rise from $1000 a year to $2000 a year and
the limits on how much an individual can cumulatively give to candidates and parties would rise
from $25,000 a year to $37,500 a year. Id.
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Where We’ve Been: FECA, Buckley and Eighth Circuit Shrinkage
1.

The Federal Elections Campaign Act

The Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) was passed in 1971 in
response to a perceived need to address the campaign abuses that plagued the
election process in the late 1960s.57 Designed to replace the 1925 Federal
Corrupt Practices Act,58 the FECA, with its emphasis on disclosure, failed to
specify its own effective date, leading to more campaign finance abuses after
its passage.59 In fact, it later became clear that President Nixon received more
than eleven million dollars in illegal corporate contributions after passage of
the FECA, during the 1972 presidential campaign.60 This, in addition to the
Watergate scandal, also paid for by illegally received funds, gave rise to the
1974 FECA amendments which pushed for much tighter restrictions on
campaign financing itself.61 The amendments limited most forms of campaign
spending, including individual, party and PAC contributions to candidates,
personal spending by candidates and independent spending by groups not
affiliated with the campaign.62 Moreover, the amendments set overall
campaign spending ceilings in federal elections.63
This comprehensive scheme, however, was never fully adopted due to the
legal challenge that ensued soon after its passage. In Buckley v. Valeo, the
Supreme Court used the First Amendment to strike down limits on independent
campaign spending, limits on a candidate’s own spending of personal funds
and mandatory campaign spending ceilings.64 Only the contribution limits,
disclosure requirements and voluntary system of public funding survived,
causing some to question the surviving bill’s workability.65 Despite its

57. For example, President Richard M. Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign was fueled
primarily by a $2.8 million gift by an individual, Clement Stone, and his wife. SORAUF, INSIDE
CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 19, at 4.
58. 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-256 (1926) (repealed 1972).
59. Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform: The General Landscape: The Siren’s
Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 24 (1997)
[hereinafter Smith, Siren’s Song].
60. Id. The Nixon campaign had refused to disclose contributions made to it during the
period just prior to the FECA’s effective date. When it was finally forced to do so, the campaign
committee revealed that it received eleven million dollars during that period, mostly in the form
of large contributions and much of it in the last forty-eight hours before FECA took effect. Id.
61. Id. at 25.
62. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263.
63. Id.
64. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
65. Id. Chief Justice Warren Burger began his dissent as follows:
By dissecting this Act bit by bit, and casting off vital parts, the Court fails to recognize
that the whole of this Act is greater than the sum of its parts. Congress intended to
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shortcomings, the basic FECA framework, as it emerged from Buckley,
remains the core of most campaign finance proposals at both the federal and
state level,66 most of which include limits on contributions, limits on total
spending and the use of public funding.67 After Buckley, the only significant
change to FECA came in 1979 when Congress passed an amendment to allow
parties to spend so-called “soft” or unregulated money without limit on
grassroots, party-building activities such as producing buttons, bumper
stickers, brochures, posters and holding voter registration and get-out-the-vote
drives.68
2.

The Buckley Framework For Analyzing Campaign Spending

The framework that Buckley put in place for analyzing the constitutionality
of campaign finance reforms can be broken down into a familiar three-part
process. First, pursuant to its power of judicial review, the Court will analyze
the ends that Congress seeks to vindicate in creating the regulation. Second,
the Court will examine the means Congress uses to regulate. Finally, the Court
will decide, based on the constitutional values at stake and the ends and means
identified, what type of scrutiny to apply to the regulation before it.69 This
decision dictates the degree to which the Court examines the particular ends
and means that Congress identifies and, thus, the degree of deference given to
Congress. This section will briefly examine how the Court accomplished this
process in Buckley, the case that set forth the model for analyzing subsequent
campaign finance reforms.

regulate all aspects of federal campaign finances, but what remains after today’s holding
leaves no more than a shadow of what Congress contemplated. I question whether the
residue leaves a workable program.
Id. at 235-36.
66. Missouri is one of the states that has adopted a FECA-like system of campaign spending
regulation. Appellee’s Brief at 3, Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000)
(No. 00-2686).
67. Smith, Faulty Assumptions, supra note 40, at 1055.
68. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(B)(x-xii), 9(B)(xiii-ix) (1994).
69. Professor BeVier discussed these three “scope of review” issues in BeVier, Specious
Arguments, supra note 44, at 1278-79. Regarding the Court’s scrutiny of legislative ends, she
said the Court’s failure to insist on a rigorous definition of corruption has expanded the
legislature’s power to reorder political realities through the mere use of labels. Regarding the
Court’s scrutiny of means, she claimed that a premise of distrust is appropriate because legislative
proposals often have the effect of protecting incumbents. Hence, she argued the Court should be
demanding in its evaluation of the means-end relationship (i.e., it should apply strict scrutiny). In
addition, she felt it appropriate for the Court to consider practical realities and political
differences when analyzing such measures, however, she doubted that strict scrutiny could
withstand political pressure because under it, no reform measures would be able to pass
constitutional muster. Id.
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Acceptable Ends: Preventing Corruption or the Appearance of
Corruption, Not Leveling the Playing Field

In Buckley, the Court determined that the only rationale for limiting
political spending is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption.70 The Court rejected the political equality rationale, popular
among many reformers, which argues that limits promote equality of political
influence, and called this notion “wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”71
Even though the Court has deemed the prevention of corruption the only
adequate rationale for campaign finance limitations, neither it nor Congress has
been able to identify what exactly constitutes corruption.72 Perhaps the closest
the Court came was in Federal Elections Commission v. National Conservative
Political Action Committee, where it said the primary hallmark of corruption
was the notion of a financial “quid pro quo” marked by the exchange or
appearance of an exchange of dollars for political favors between donors and
elected officials.73 In certain contexts the Court has accepted a broader
meaning of corruption by viewing it as undue influence on the outcome of an
70. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
71. Id. at 48-49. See also Smith, Siren’s Song, supra note 59, at 42. Professor Smith offered
a critique of the political equality rationale. He likened the political equality rationale to the
siren’s song that enticed the sailors in Homer’s Odyssey, concluding that while the music of the
reformers (sirens) is sweet—political equality and the end to corruption, scandal and nastiness in
American politics—the promise is unfulfilled and the quest carries with it a very high price. Id.
Professor Smith never passes up an opportunity to criticize the political equality
rationale for campaign finance reform. In another article, he drew a parallel to socialism, noting
that as efforts to create economic equality impoverished all, causing greater corruption, the effort
to socialize America’s political dialogue through regulation will also lead to increased corruption,
more power for the elites at the top and an impoverished political life for everyone else. Bradley
A. Smith, Regulation and the Decline of Grassroots Politics, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2000).
For even more criticism by the current FEC commissioner see generally Smith, Faulty
Assumptions, supra note 40.
72. Nagle, supra note 33, at 316. In his review of Elizabeth Drew’s book on the corruption
of American politics, see supra note 29, Professor Nagle identified three distinct meanings of
corruption: first, corruption as a quid pro quo arrangement; second, corruption as monetary
influence on the actions of elected officials; and third, corruption as inconsistency with public
opinion.
Professor Nagle went on to criticize Drew’s failure to define what she meant by the
corruption and then proposed an alternative metaphor, that of pollution. Pointing out that the
meaning of corruption is itself a significant point of debate in the Senate, because no Senator is
ready to acknowledge that he or she has been corrupted, Nagle claimed that the pollution
metaphor enables one to consider money’s effect on the political environment as a whole rather
than on individual legislators. In his article, Nagle analogizes his idea of political pollution to
environmental and cultural pollution, comparing regulatory approaches to each. See generally
Nagle, supra note 33. See also Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 100 (explaining that the
Court has failed to adequately define corruption).
73. Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
497 (1984).
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election that could undermine “the confidence of the people in the democratic
process and the integrity of the government.”74 In addition, the Court has
implicitly recognized the “anti-evasion rationale,” based on the understanding
that preventing circumvention of campaign finance laws (for example, the
individual contribution limitation)75 is another means by which the state
prevents the appearance of corruption.76 The state of Missouri used both the
anti-corruption and the anti-evasion rationales to justify its regulation of
political parties in Lamb III.77
b.

Acceptable Means: Contribution Limits, Not Expenditure Limits

In determining whether a regulation implicates First Amendment concerns
in a manner that makes the regulation unconstitutional, the Court has placed
great emphasis on the distinction between contributions and expenditures.78 In
Buckley, the Court established that contributions entail a lower order of speech
than expenditures.79 It reasoned that contributions can be restricted because
they do not involve a direct expression of political views, but rather, serve “as
a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but [do] not
communicate the underlying basis for the support.”80 The expressive
component of a contribution, the Court explained, rests solely on the
undifferentiated symbolic act of contribution; however, the size of the
contribution does not “increase perceptibly” the quantity of the contributor’s
communication.81 Moreover, while a contribution may result in political
speech by a candidate presenting views to voters, “the transformation of
74. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (dealing with
contributions made in the corporate context). See also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition
for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 301 (1981). It is clear that in contexts where
the Court has accepted a broader meaning of corruption, what the Court is concerned about is
preventing the appearance of corruption rather than preventing actual corruption.
75. Because the individual contribution limit is the lowest, as well as the most common, type
of regulated campaign spending, it is the type that Congress is most concerned with preventing
others from circumventing.
76. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 197-98 (1981). In California
Medical Association (CalMed), Justice Marshall, delivering part of the opinion of the Court,
noted “Congress enacted [the limitations on contributions to political action committees] in part
to prevent circumvention of the very limitations on contributions that this court upheld in
Buckley.” Id. See also Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 100 F. Supp. 2d 990, 998 (quoting
Justice Marshall’s CalMed opinion as support for Missouri’s anti-evasion rationale) [hereinafter
Lamb II]. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of Lamb II.
77. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
Lamb III].
78. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976). See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the
contribution-expenditure distinction.
79. Id. at 21.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor.”82 The Court has referred to this idea as “speech by proxy.”83
Regarding contributions, the Court also concluded that they raise the
possibility of “quid pro quo” corruption because one can easily imagine a large
contribution being given to secure a political quid pro quo from an
officeholder.84
In contrast, because expenditures represent “independent” spending by
candidates, organizations and individuals on direct communication with voters,
the Court held them to be core political speech, which did not raise the danger
of corrupting candidates.85 Thus, Buckley invalidated FECA’s restrictions on
expenditures by candidates and independent committees.86 Buckley did,
however, let stand FECA’s regulation of spending “in connection with” an
election campaign, otherwise known as a coordinated expenditure (the Federal
Elections Commission (FEC) puts this in the contribution category).87 Not
surprisingly, this party-specific category eventually became the vehicle by
which campaign spending in the political party context reached the Supreme
Court.88
c.

First Amendment “Exacting Scrutiny”

Campaign finance regulations encroach upon core First Amendment
concerns of political speech and association.89 Without directly equating
money to speech, the Court in Buckley found that money was essential for the
dissemination of political messages and that contributions to campaigns allows
“like minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common
political goals.”90 Thus, because campaign spending rises to the level of
“speech,” government regulation of campaign spending is subject to the
“exacting scrutiny” required by the First Amendment.91 The Court’s

82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981).
84. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
85. Id. at 46-48. See supra note 46 for the Court’s rationale for this conclusion.
86. Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 97.
87. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42-43. See Richard Briffault, Law and Political Parties: The
Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 625 (2000)
(explaining that the FECA does give some degree of special treatment to political parties by
giving them the ability to make limited coordinated expenditures to candidates, an ability shared
by no other group or entity).
88. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604
(1996).
89. Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 96.
90. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
91. Id. at 16. Since Buckley courts have struggled with what level of review is implicated by
“exacting scrutiny,” strict or intermediate, with respect to different types of campaign finance
reforms. See, e.g., Criscimagna, supra note 18 (discussing the level of scrutiny required by the
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application of exacting scrutiny, however, has been somewhat inexact.92 Due
to the different categories of campaign spending, the Supreme Court has varied
both the level of scrutiny and, therefore, the degree of deference given to
legislative enactments.93 In Buckley, the Court deferred to Congress regarding
the level of limits on individual contributions to candidates and on the overall
limit on individual contributions to political committees in a year.94 Regarding
the amount of the limits, the Court stated that “we cannot require Congress to
establish that it has chosen the highest reasonable threshold.”95 The size of the
limit was therefore upheld because it was not wholly without rationality.96 The
Court, however, has indicated that it is less willing to defer to Congress’s
judgment or espoused rationale where, for example, the regulation is of
independent expenditures, a type of campaign spending which it thinks
deserves greater First Amendment protection and which does not carry the
same risk of corruption.97 In this situation, the Court will afford little
deference to legislators and may not even consider any evidence the
government offers.98
3.

Eighth Circuit Precedent: The Shrinkage of Acceptable Justifications
for Limits on Campaign Spending

The Eighth Circuit has considered more cases challenging campaign
contribution limits than any other circuit, earning a reputation for finding all
spending limits unconstitutional.99 Some commentators believe that the

Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence and comparing it to the type of scrutiny applied
by the Eighth Circuit). See also La Pierre, First Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18, at 228-30
(discussing the “real harm” standard and corresponding strict scrutiny required by the Eighth
Circuit); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1985) (explaining that the level of
review decision reflects the resolution of critically important preliminary issues, which are based
on the extent to which constitutional rights are implicated) [hereinafter BeVier, Money and
Politics].
92. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 33, at 329. According to Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 384-85 (2000), the level of scrutiny is uncertain, but it is certainly not the strict
scrutiny that the Court applies to efforts to regulate various forms of cultural “pollution” that
implicate the same free speech value, such as violent movies and hate speech. Id.
93. Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 103. In addition, because the constitutional
question is usually both an empirical and a normative one, the inquiry must include an analysis of
whether corruption is present in a given situation. Id. at 102-03.
94. Id. at 103.
95. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 83.
96. Id.
97. See supra note 46.
98. Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 103.
99. For a more detailed history of campaign finance reform cases in the Eighth Circuit and a
summary of contribution caps in the United States, see William J. Connolly, Note, How Low Can
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standard of review in the Eighth Circuit is so strict so as to make campaign
finance reform limiting contributions impossible in its jurisdiction.100 Two
themes have characterized the Eighth Circuit’s campaign finance
jurisprudence: (1) the contribution limits have been too low and thus not
“narrowly drawn” to meet the particular state’s interest in combating
corruption;101 and (2) the state has not been able to demonstrate that the harms
it is trying to prevent are real.102 As a result of these two themes, states within
the Eighth Circuit have experienced the shrinkage of options when it comes to
regulating campaign spending. One case in particular, Shrink Missouri
Government PAC v. Adams103 (Shrink I), demonstrates how the Eighth Circuit

You Go? State Campaign Contribution Limits and the First Amendment, 76 B.U. L. REV. 483
(1996). See also La Pierre, First Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18; Criscimagna, supra note 18.
100. See Criscimagna, supra note 18, at 458.
101. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994). In Day, the Eighth Circuit struck down
two Minnesota statutory provisions that limited individual campaign expenditures and
contributions to political committees each to $100. The court accepted the state’s anti-corruption
rationale but found that the requirements of the second part of the Buckley test—the “narrowly
drawn” requirement—were not met. The $100 limit, an inflation-adjusted $40.60 compared to
the $1000 individual limit examined in Buckley, was simply “too low to allow meaningful
participation in protected political speech and association, and thus was not narrowly tailored to
serve the state’s legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of the political system.” Id. at 1366.
Judge Pasco Bowman, the only one of the three judges who did not write an opinion in Lamb III,
wrote the Day opinion for a unanimous court.
In Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit was again
confronted with low contribution limits, this time as part of an Arkansas statute. As in Day, the
court found these limits in violation of the “narrowly drawn” element of Buckley, concluding they
were too low to enable successful political advocacy in Arkansas. Russell, 146 F.3d at 571.
Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold, who wrote the court’s opinion in Lamb III, authored the court’s
unanimous opinion in Russell.
102. In Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), the
court again held that a statute which limited individual campaign contributions in Missouri to
$100 to $300 per election cycle was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. Carver, 72 F.3d at 645.
In addition to finding the limits too low, the court required Missouri to meet a high
evidentiary burden before allowing any abridgement of a person or group’s First Amendment
rights. The court stated the government must do more than simply postulate a compelling interest
when restricting campaign contributions. Instead, the state had to “demonstrate that the recited
harms are real . . . and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way.” Id. at 638 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475
(1995)). Judge John R. Gibson, the same judge who wrote the dissent in Lamb III, wrote the
opinion for a unanimous court. See La Pierre, First Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18, at 235-37
(discussing of the origin of the Eighth Circuit’s real harm standard).
103. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Shrink I].
This case was later overturned by the Supreme Court. Judge John R. Gibson filed a dissent in this
case, as he did in Lamb III. He claimed that the Eighth Circuit gave Carver, an opinion he had
written, a far too expansive reading. Because he could not distinguish the Buckley limits on
individual contributions from Missouri’s limits on such contributions, he would have affirmed the
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approaches this topic. In addition, Shrink I provides a means by which to
compare the Eighth Circuit’s approach to the Supreme Court’s approach, as
demonstrated in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (Shrink II).
The plaintiff in Shrink I was a candidate who received funds in excess of
Missouri’s limits from the Shrink Missouri Government PAC.104 Believing
that the limits seriously hampered his ability to campaign effectively, he
alleged that the state’s evidence was insufficient to meet its burden and that the
limits were unconstitutionally low.105 Using a strict scrutiny standard, the
Eighth Circuit discounted the evidence proffered by the state as “conclusory
and self-serving,” holding that the standard, which requires objective proof of
perceived corruption in Missouri’s political process, was not met.106 In
addition, relying on its earlier precedent, the court stated the restrictions were
not narrowly tailored and were too low to allow for effective political dialogue
in Missouri because they prevented “many candidates from amassing the
resources necessary for effective advocacy.”107 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to this case, however, and handed down its decision in June of 2000.
Reversing Shrink I by a 6-3 margin, the Supreme Court decided what some
commentators believe was the most important campaign finance reform case
since Buckley.108
Perhaps not surprisingly, in overturning Shrink I, the Court relied heavily
on Buckley.109 First, while acknowledging the “exacting scrutiny” called for
by Buckley, the Court concluded the state statute was not void for lack of
evidence, where the legitimacy of the espoused state interest was so wellentrenched in Supreme Court jurisprudence as a justification for contribution
limits.110 The Court stated that “the quantum of empirical evidence needed to
district court’s ruling and found the limits constitutional (which is what the Supreme Court
eventually did). Id. at 524.
104. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 383 (2000) [hereinafter Shrink II].
105. Shrink I, 161 F.3d at 523. The contribution limits under challenge in Shrink I were $275,
$525 or $1075, depending on the office of the person. Id. at 519.
106. Id. at 522.
107. Id. at 523 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)).
108. See Jane Conrad, Note, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: Campaign
Contributions, Symbolic Speech and the Appearance of Corruption, 33 AKRON L. REV. 551, 551
(2000) (arguing that Shrink II was the most important case since Buckley because it was the first
time the Court considered the constitutionality of limits on individual contributions since then).
109. Shrink II, 528 U.S. at 385-90. Justice Souter authored the opinion for the Court.
110. Id. at 391-94. The Court stated: “Buckley demonstrates that the dangers of large, corrupt
contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor
implausible.” Id. at 391. In essence, what the Court did with respect to the contribution limits at
issue in Shrink II was take judicial notice of the fact that large political contributions cause
corruption or the appearance of corruption. Having done so, the level of proof required was zero.
See Jeremiah W. Nixon & Paul R. Maguffee, Money Talks: In Defense of a Common-Sense
Approach to Judicial Review of Campaign Contribution Limits, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 661, 674
(2000).
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satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny will vary up or down with the novelty and
plausibility of the justification raised.”111 Since Missouri’s justification, in the
individual contribution context, was neither novel nor implausible, the Court
concluded this was not even a “close call” on the issue of evidentiary
obligation.112 In addition, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s assumption
that Buckley set a minimum constitutional threshold for contribution limits,
calling it a fundamental misunderstanding of the case.113 In sum, the Court
explained that the “numbers game”114 the Eighth Circuit played in Shrink I and
previous cases, whereby it compared the inflation adjusted present day limit to
the $1000 Buckley limit, was a misguided application of Buckley.115 Analyzing
the size of the limits properly, the Court concluded that these limits were not so
low as to impede a candidate’s ability to conduct effective advocacy.116
C. Where We’re Going: Colorado Republican II and Limits in the Party
Context
The Supreme Court will almost certainly decide the viability of campaign
spending limits on political parties this summer when it issues its Colorado
Republican II opinion. In Colorado Republican I,117 the Court struggled to
properly categorize political party expenditures, all of which have

111. Shrink II, 528 U.S. at 391.
112. Id. at 393. For a critique of the “plausible harm” standard set out by the Court in Shrink
II, see D. Bruce LaPierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to Public Fears About ‘Big
Money’ and Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 725-26 (2000) [hereinafter LaPierre,
Pandering to Public Fears].
113. Shrink II, 528 U.S. at 397.
114. See Connolly, supra note 99, at 486 (calling the Eighth Circuit’s use of a comparative
method by which it compared the limits deemed constitutional in Buckley to the limits established
by various states as a “numbers game”). See supra text accompanying notes 101-03 (discussing
these Eighth Circuit cases).
115. Shrink II, 528 U.S. at 396.
116. Id. at 397. When Shrink II returned to the Eighth Circuit after being reversed, Judge
Pasco Bowman wrote a brief concurring opinion in which he stated:
In [Shrink II], the Supreme Court has spoken in a way that subordinates core First
Amendment rights of free speech and free association to the predilections of the
legislature and the mood of the electorate. Given the decision and the current political
climate, we no doubt can expect further, even more draconian, efforts by government to
restrict political speech . . . .
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 204 F.3d 838, 843 (2000) (Bowman, J., concurring).
117. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604
(1996) [hereinafter Colorado Republican I]. During the 1986 Colorado senate campaign, the
Colorado Republican Party aired television and radio advertisements criticizing incumbent
Democratic Senator Tim Wirth. The expense of these advertisements, which aired at a time when
there were three Republican candidates seeking the Republican nomination, were above the limits
established by FECA. Id. at 608.
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contributions at their root.118 Indeed, this very problem caused the Court to
issue a narrow plurality opinion because no more than three justices could
agree on the proper characterization of political party spending in the context
of campaigns.119 In Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion, the Court based its
holding on the “constitutionally significant fact” that Colorado Republican’s
expenditure was independent of its candidates.120 The opinion avoided any
statement that the parties enjoy a preferred position under the Constitution with
respect to campaign spending and rejected the argument that a party and its
candidates are identical.121 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justices
Rehnquist and Scalia, rejected the notion of party independence from
candidates, concluding that regardless of the nature of the expenditure, party
spending ought to be constitutionally protected. 122 Justice Thomas’s
concurrence, also joined by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, claimed that
because party spending presents only a minimal danger of corruption, there
exists no constitutional basis for its limitation.123 In a brief dissent, Justice

118. This is so because some individual or group must contribute money to a political party
for it to have money to expend or contribute to a candidate.
119. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 613. The Court refused to reach the facial challenge
to the Party Expenditure Provision, choosing to consider only whether the provision as applied
violated the First Amendment. Id.
120. Id. at 617. This is because the Republican candidate had not even been determined yet,
therefore immunizing it to the danger of quid pro quo corruption. Id.
121. Id. at 624. The Court implicitly rejected the contention of the concurrences that parties
are incapable of corrupting their candidates by commenting that parties and PACs share certain
features. Id. Since the FEC could not prove that independent spending by parties was either
impossible or corruptive, the plurality was forced to view this as an independent expenditure,
acknowledging that because party expenditures do not fit neatly into any of Buckley’s conceptual
boxes, it could not consider Colorado Republican’s broader challenge to the constitutionality of
limits on any kind of party spending. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 624-25.
122. Id. at 630. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion was extensively quoted by both the
district court and the Eighth Circuit in Lamb, see infra Part III.B and Part III.C. It explicitly
rejected the plurality’s emphasis on the independence of Colorado Republican’s spending.
Instead, Justice Kennedy stated there is a practical identity of interests between candidates and
parties during an election and noted “the tradition of political parties and candidates engaging in
joint First Amendment activity.” Id. In addition, he observed that a party’s fate is “inextricably
intertwined with that of its candidates,” and that parties require candidates to make their messages
known. Id.
Acknowledging that party spending will tend to function as a contribution to a candidate,
Justice Kennedy claimed that such spending by a party also represents spending on its own
behalf. For these reasons, he concluded that as the political speech of a political association,
party spending, even where coordinated, could not be constitutionally limited. Id. However, he
distinguished “undifferentiated” party contributions from coordinated expenditures, claiming that
Congress may have authority to restrict undifferentiated contributions, but that these were “not at
issue here.” Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 630.
123. Id. at 646. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas maintained that there is no danger of
corruption where a party is supporting its own candidate. He considered and responded to two
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Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, stated that despite the unique relationship
between parties and candidates, Congress could constitutionally limit all
political party spending.124
On remand, the parties to Colorado Republican compiled an extensive
record in order to answer the broader question of whether the FECA’s limits on
coordinated party expenditures were constitutional.125 The district court placed
a heavy burden of proof on the FEC after weighing the First Amendment
interests at stake. It concluded that a political party has a First Amendment
interest that is superior to that of individuals with respect to restrictions on
campaign contributions. Explaining that the First Amendment has its “fullest
and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political

possible sources of corruption. First, he considered the influence of the party itself on the
candidate, concluding that party influence could never be corruptive since “[t]he very aim of a
political party is to influence its candidate’s stance on issues.” Id. Thus, he reasoned, if a party
succeeds, “that is not corruption; that is successful advocacy of ideas in the political marketplace
and republican government in a party system.” Id.
Second, Justice Thomas considered the possibility of a donor exerting undue influence
over candidates through the parties, concluding that parties have a diffusing effect which lowers
any corruptive force. Id. He said that the “numerous members with a wide variety of interests”
in a party make it unlikely that any particular member will be able to exact a quid pro quo from a
candidate. Id. at 647. In addition, he explained that there is little risk that a wealthy donor could
use a party as a “conduit” because Congress can still subject individuals to limits on contributions
to the parties. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 646.
In a separate portion of the opinion, however, Justice Thomas said he would also regard
such contribution caps as unconstitutional. In that portion, he argued that there is no
constitutional difference between a contribution and an expenditure and that, in his opinion,
neither can be constitutionally limited. Id. The four justices represented in the two concurrences,
therefore, all agree that the FECA’s ceiling on coordinated party spending, which the FECA
defines as a contribution, should be held unconstitutional. Hence, it would appear that only one
more justice is needed to uphold the Tenth Circuit’s decision in the remanded portion of
Colorado Republican I.
124. Id. at 648. Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Kennedy that parties and candidates share
a unique relationship, thus precluding a finding of independence. Id. However, he questioned
Justice Thomas’s conclusion that a party’s coordinated spending cannot corrupt its candidates.
Id. Instead, he maintained that such spending could enable the party or those controlling its
influence to influence the candidate “by virtue of its power to spend” and that the lack of limits
would enable donors to use the party as a conduit. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 648. In
addition, he paid tribute to the political equality rationale, reasoning that a spending limit of this
nature has the effect of leveling the electoral playing field. Id.
125. Colorado Republican v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 213 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Colorado Republican Remand II]. The Supreme Court refused to reach this question
in 1996 because a holding on coordinated expenditures would have implicated a broader range of
issues, including the constitutionality of party contribution limits (since the FEC equates a
coordinated expenditure to a contribution). Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 624.
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office,”126 and recognizing the historical importance of party involvement in
campaigns, the court held unconstitutional the FECA’s Party Expenditure
Provision, which restricted a party’s coordinated expenditures.127 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.128 In doing so, the court
questioned whether the contribution-expenditure dichotomy applied to political
parties129 and discussed at length the important place of political parties in the
American political system.130 The court also questioned the FEC’s anticorruption rationale for the restriction, pointing out that the idea that political
parties can corrupt their candidates is a misunderstanding of the role of
political parties in America.131 Because parties represent such a broad-based
coalition of interests, the court reasoned that any corruptive force will be
diluted.132 For these reasons, the court held that FECA’s Party Expenditure
Provision constituted an unnecessary abridgement of a political party’s First
Amendment rights.133 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to this case on
October 12, 2000 and heard oral arguments on February 28, 2001.134
The briefs that have been filed in Colorado Republican II indicate that the
Court’s ruling will have far-reaching implications for America’s political
parties. Not only have both of the parties to Missouri Republican Party v.
Lamb filed amicus briefs in the case, they also apparently agree that if the
Court upholds the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, the regulation of political party
support for candidates will effectively come to an end.135 This is so because,

126. Colorado Republican v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 41 F. Supp.2d 1197, 1209 (D. Colo.
1999), (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989))
[hereinafter Colorado Republican Remand I].
127. Colorado Republican Remand I, 41 F. Supp.2d at 1214.
128. Colorado Republican Remand II, 213 F.3d at 1221.
129. Id. at 1227. The court acknowledged that FECA labels a coordinated expenditure as a
contribution. Id. at 1226. However, it stated that such a “cubbyholing” of constitutional values
under labels such as contribution and expenditure “cheapens the currency.” Id. at 1232.
130. Id. at 1228. Highlighting the fact that they are not “economic actors” in the same sense
that individuals and PACs are, the court explained that all three branches of government rely
heavily on the speech and associational functions of political parties to assure the orderly conduct
of government, including elections and the appointment process. Colorado Republican Remand
II, 213 F.3d at 1227-28.
131. Id. at 1231 n.7.
132. Id. at 1231. It even quoted the maxim of sanitation engineers: “the solution to pollution
is dilution.” Id.
133. Id. at 1232-33.
134. See 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000). See also supra note 12.
135. See Brief of Amici Curiae State of Mo. at 8, Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2001) (No. 00-191), available at 2000 WL 1793085
(“Because the Tenth Circuit’s holding is broad enough to cover expenditures regardless of the
level of coordination—it would effectively end the regulation of financial support by political
parties to candidates.”); See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Missouri Republican Party at 3, Fed.
Elections Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2001) (No. 00-191),
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as the Missouri Republican Party readily admits, parties typically do not make
simple contributions to their candidates.136 In reality, all party spending is
coordinated such that when funds are “contributed” to candidates, there has
almost certainly been some discussion between the party and the candidate as
to how those funds are to be used.137 Consequently, if the Supreme Court was
to strike down limits on coordinated expenditures, it would essentially render
moot the issue examined in Lamb—namely, limits on political party
contributions.138 The oral arguments provided few hints as to how the Court
will rule. However, the positions of all but three of the justices were
established in the four opinions written in Colorado Republican I. Most
commentators believe that Justice O’Connor will provide the swing vote
because it appears that Justices Breyer and Souter will join Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg in their support for coordinated expenditure limits.139
Consideration of this case is taking place concurrently with debates on
campaign finance reform in Congress, making the Court’s ruling an even more
anticipated one. This much seems clear at present: If the Court decides to
affirm the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Colorado Republican II—a holding upon
which the Eighth Circuit relied in Lamb—any legislative victory gained in
Congress could be a pyrrhic one at best.
III. INSTANT DECISION: MISSOURI REPUBLICAN PARTY V. LAMB
A.

Introduction

The dispute arose in November 1998 after the Missouri Ethics
Commission informed plaintiffs they were in violation of Missouri Revised
Statute section 130.032.4, which limits the amount of cash and in-kind
contributions that a political party can make and accept in any one election.140

available at 2001 WL 43223 (“The [Missouri Republican Party] provides financial support for
Republican candidates only after consultation with the candidate and the candidate’s committee
and in cooperation with the candidate and the candidate committee.”).
136. Id.
137. See id. See also Appellant’s Brief at 10, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d
1070 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-2686).
138. Nevertheless, the state argues in its petition for writ of certiorari that the need for review
will actually be greater if the Court strikes down limits on coordinated expenditures, because the
only remaining limits under the federal scheme would be those on contributions. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Nixon v. Missouri Republican Party at 25 (No 00-1136).
139. Damon Chappie & Thaddeus DeJesus, High Court Hears Arguments in Colorado Case,
ROLL CALL, Mar. 1, 2001 (noting that both Justices Breyer and Souter expressed concern in the
oral arguments about the effects of removing another limit on the amount of campaign spending).
140. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp.2d 1161, 1162 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
[hereinafter Lamb I]. The statute reads:

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

MISSOURI’S SACRIFICIAL LAMB

949

The plaintiffs included the Missouri Republican Party, three candidate
committees and their treasurers and three state-level candidates, including the
Republican candidate for state auditor, and candidates for two different state
senate seats.141 One defendant, Charles G. Lamb, was the Executive Director
of the Missouri Ethics Commission and other defendants included the
chairperson and vice-chairperson of that commission and the Missouri
Attorney General, Jeremiah W. Nixon.142
In 1994, the Missouri legislature adopted the statute in question as part of a
comprehensive campaign finance reform bill.143 The individual contribution
limits that were part of that bill have also been challenged, and after the Eighth
Circuit found them unconstitutional, the Supreme Court declared them
constitutional in Shrink II.144 As will become evident, the district court relied
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Shrink II when making its decision
regarding political party contributions.145 Under the statute, any committee
that accepts or gives contributions in excess of the statutory limits is subject to
a significant penalty, unless the contribution is promptly returned to the
contributor after the Ethics Commission notifies it of the violation.146 The per
Except as limited by this subsection, the amount of cash contributions, and a separate
amount for the amount of in-kind contributions, made by or accepted from a political
party committee in any one election shall not exceed the following:
(1) To elect an individual to the office of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of
state, state treasurer, state auditor or attorney general, ten thousand dollars;
(2) To elect an individual to the office of state senator, five thousand dollars;
(3) To elect an individual to the office of state representative, two thousand five hundred
dollars; and
(4) To elect an individual to any other office of an electoral district, ward or unit, ten
times the allowable contribution limit for the office sought.
MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.4 (1999). Missouri Revised Statute section 130.032.2 requires limits
contained in section 130.032.4 be adjusted for inflation every even-numbered year by a
calculation employing the cumulative consumer price index. See MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.2
(1999). In 1998, the Missouri Ethics Commission thus increased the limits in § 130.032.4(1)-(3)
to $10,750, $5,250, and $2,750 respectively. Lamb I, 31 F. Supp.2d at 1162. Twenty-seven
states limit the amount a political party can contribute to a candidate. Seventeen states have
scaled limitations and ten states have a singular ceiling. The other twenty-three states do not limit
political party contributions. EDWARD D. FEIGENBAUM & JAMES A. PALMER, FED. ELECTION
COMM’N, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 2000: A SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS
WITH QUICK REFERENCE CHARTS chart 2-B (2000).
141. Lamb I, 31 F. Supp.2d at 1161-62.
142. Id. at 1162.
143. Both Senate Bill 650 and Proposition A amended Missouri’s Campaign Finance
Disclosure Law. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.011-.160 (1994 & Supp. 1998). See also LaPierre, First
Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18, at 218-19 (discussing the 1994 legislation in depth).
144. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 903 (2000). See supra Part II.B.3 for a
discussion of this case.
145. See infra Part III.B (dealing with the district court’s rationale for its holding in Lamb II).
146. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032.7 (1999).
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contribution penalty is $1000 plus an amount equal to the contribution.147 The
candidate and the committee are personally liable for payment of the penalty,
or alternatively, they may pay the penalty from the campaign funds existing on
the date of notification by the Ethics Commission.148
In the 1998 general election, the Missouri Republican Party made a
number of monetary contributions to the other plaintiffs in the case (in
particular, to each candidate’s committee).149 The Republican Party’s
contributions to each candidate’s committee were in excess of the statutory
limits.150 Consequently, in late October and early November 1998, the Ethics
Commission separately informed each of the candidates that his committee
was in violation of the section 130.032.4 limits and demanded that the party
contributions be returned to the degree that they exceeded the limits.151 The
plaintiffs then decided to file suit seeking to enjoin enforcement and to have
the statute declared unconstitutional.152 The cause of action alleged that the
provisions of the Missouri campaign finance statute that restricted political
party contributions violated the party’s First Amendment rights under the U.S.
Constitution.153
On January 13, 1999, the district court decided, pursuant to previous
Eighth Circuit cases declaring contribution limits unconstitutional, that
plaintiffs had met the burden necessary to receive a preliminary injunction
against enforcement.154 On March 1, 1999, the court stayed the proceeding
pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Shrink II.155 After Shrink II declared
Missouri’s individual contribution limits constitutional, the state moved to
vacate the preliminary injunction, which the district court denied, choosing
instead to set the case for expedited briefing and a hearing on the merits.156
The case was set for trial on July 5, 2000, but it never went to trial;157 on June
22, 2000, the district court awarded summary judgment to defendants.158 The

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 31 F. Supp.2d 1161, 1162 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1161.
154. Lamb I, 31 F. Supp.2d at 1163.
155. Brief for Appellant at 3, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir.
2000) (No. 00-2686); Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 100 F. Supp.2d 990, 992 (E.D. Mo.
2000) [hereinafter Lamb II].
156. Brief for Appellant at 4, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir.
2000) (No. 00-2686). Missouri filed a notice of appeal, followed by a motion to expedite the
appeal, after the preliminary injunction was granted. The Eighth Circuit, however, denied
Missouri’s motions. Id.
157. Id.
158. Lamb II, 100 F. Supp.2d at 991.
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court found that the Republican Party’s financial donations to plaintiff
candidates were contributions rather than expenditures because the candidates
had control over the use of the funds. Thus, the court held that Shrink II
required it to find the state’s limits on political party contributions
constitutional.159
B.

District Court Rationale: A Contribution is a Contribution; Shrink II
Governs

One fact dictated the district court’s consideration of Lamb II—the fact
that the campaign spending in question was a contribution as opposed to a
coordinated or independent expenditure.160 After making the preliminary
determination that these were contributions, Judge Catherine D. Perry161 began
her analysis with two questions.162 First, were contributions made by political
parties subject to the same standards applied to contributions made by
individuals and entities other than political party committees, such as PACs?163
Second, how could the limitations be effected?164 The court looked to Shrink
II for the appropriate standard, explaining that contribution limits could survive
if the government demonstrated that the regulation was closely drawn to match
a sufficiently important state interest.165 Concerning the amount of the
limitation, the relevant test was whether the limit was so radical as to render
political association ineffective, thus driving out the sound of the candidate’s
voice and making contributions worthless.166
The court’s determination that these were contributions affected the
standard of review it applied and thus the deference given to Missouri’s elected

159. Id. at 992, 994.
160. Shrink II upheld Missouri’s individual contribution limits and the district court found
that because Missouri’s regulation was of a contribution, Shrink II required it to uphold the
constitutionality of the regulation. Id. at 992. The Missouri Republican Party argued that the
spending at issue was a coordinated expenditure. Id. at 993-94. In its opposition brief to the
state’s petition for certiorari, the party maintained that there remains a substantial question in the
case whether the lower courts properly labeled the support provided by the party to its candidates
“contributions” instead of “expenditures.” Brief in Opposition at 18, Nixon v. Missouri
Republican Party (No. 00-1136).
161. U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, Catherine D. Perry, also
authored the district court opinion in Shrink, an opinion the Supreme Court eventually agreed
with. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp.2d 734 (E.D. Mo. 1998). In addition, she
authored one other campaign finance opinion. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp.
1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
162. Lamb II, 100 F. Supp.2d at 995.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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decision-makers.167 Applying the intermediate scrutiny standard that the
Supreme Court applied to contributions in Buckley, the court accepted the
state’s two interests—anti-corruption and anti-evasion—as sufficient without
specific evidentiary proof.168 Its understanding of Buckley and Shrink II led
the district court to conclude that the constitutionality of a limitation hinges not
on the identity of the contributor but on the type of financial support.169
Because the type of support implicated in this case was a contribution, it was
of little concern to the court that the contributor was a political party.
Nevertheless, the court considered the Missouri Republican Party’s argument
that contributions in the party-candidate context require a different analysis
based on their common identity and the minimal corruption dangers.170 Judge
Perry distinguished Justice Kennedy’s Colorado Republican I concurrence by
pointing to Justice Kennedy’s statement that Congress may have the ability to
Because these
restrict undifferentiated political party contributions.171
contributions were precisely that, as opposed to coordinated expenditures, she
reasoned that his conclusion was not applicable.172 In addition, while she
found Justice Thomas’s opinion in that case persuasive, Judge Perry felt
constrained to rely on Shrink II’s holding which found Colorado Republican I
inapposite to the question of campaign contribution limits.173
Having answered the “whether” question in the affirmative by finding that
a contribution is a contribution, the court was easily able to satisfy Shrink II’s
“sufficiently important interest” test. This was so because both the state’s anticorruption and anti-evasion justifications are well-entrenched in the Supreme
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.174 The court then turned to the “how”
question, which examines the “closely drawn” element of the Shrink II test.

167. Lamb II, 100 F. Supp.2d at 995-96.
168. Id. at 998-99.
169. Id. at 996.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 997. Judge Perry stated that “[u]nfortunately for [the] plaintiffs, [undifferentiated
party contributions are] . . . exactly the type of regulation at issue here.” Id. See supra note 122
for a discussion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Colorado Republican I.
172. Lamb II, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
173. Id. Judge Perry exclaimed that “[w]hile I find Justice Thomas’ reasoning concerning the
nature of political parties appealing as a policy statement, I believe that [Shrink II] requires me to
reject it for purposes of deciding this case.” Id. Her conclusion echoed this line of thought:
Were I writing this opinion on a blank slate, I might well conclude that political parties
should be exempted from the legal standards governing other kinds of campaign
contributors because of their special role in American politics. I might even adopt the
approach advocated by Justice Thomas in Colorado Republican . . . .
Id. at 1000. See supra note 123 for a discussion of Justice Thomas’s Colorado Republican I
opinion.
174. See supra note 110. The Shrink II Court affirmed the strength of these justifications
when regulating contributions.
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Finding that these limits were not “so radical . . . as to render contributions
pointless,” the court held that the statute was closely drawn to meet a
sufficiently important interest and therefore was constitutional.175 The
Missouri Republican Party appealed the district court’s decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. After hearing oral arguments,
the Eighth Circuit handed down its decision on August 9, 2000.176
C. Eighth Circuit Opinion: Political Party Contributions are Different; See
Buckley and Colorado Republican I
The majority opinion in Lamb III, written by Circuit Judge Morris
Sheppard Arnold, agreed with the district court on one fact, that the spending
in question was a contribution.177 However, the agreement ended there.
Because of the identity of the contributor, the Eighth Circuit came to a
conclusion different from that of the district court, basing its decision on
different precedent. Even though it applied the Shrink II standard, the Eighth
Circuit claimed that Shrink II’s applicability was limited because the fact that
the plaintiff was a political party distinguished the case “in a crucial way.”178
Consequently, the court fit Lamb III between Buckley, which allowed
limitations on individual contributions, and Colorado Republican I, which
disallowed limitations on independent political party expenditures (with four
justices arguing that coordinated expenditure limitations should also have been
disallowed).179 Fueled by precedent of this nature, the court felt free to
establish a new rule for political party contributions based on the Supreme
Court’s description of a contribution in Buckley and its analysis of the party
context in Colorado Republican I.
By analyzing Buckley’s description of an individual contribution, which
likened it to a “general expression of support” that did not communicate the
underlying basis of the support, the Eighth Circuit found that these
considerations did not carry the same force when applied to political party
contributions.180 The court stated the object of a party is to elect candidates to

175. Lamb II, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
176. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1070 (8th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
Lamb III].
177. Id. at 1071. The other circuit judges before whom this case was argued included Circuit
Judge Pasco Bowman and Circuit Judge John R. Gibson. For news coverage of the case, see Kit
Wagar, Court Kills State Party Fund Limit; Missouri’s Nixon Vows to Appeal Ruling, KANSAS
CITY STAR, Sep. 12, 2000, at A-1; Tim Bryant, Appeals Panel Rejects Limit on Campaign
Spending by Parties; Judges’ Ruling Says Missouri Law Violates Free Speech Rights; Fight is not
Over, Says Nixon, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sep. 12, 2000, at A-4.
178. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1072.
179. Id. at 1071.
180. Id. at 1072.
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office.181 Consequently, the candidate’s speech is in many ways the party’s
Although it
own speech such that they are “virtual alter egos.”182
acknowledged that there are some observable differences between the two, the
court concluded that the identities of a party and candidate merge in such a
way that makes their dealings “more than merely transient symbiotic ones
between separate and distinct entities.”183 For this reason, it becomes
impossible to say in Buckley’s words, as the district court did, that a party’s
contribution does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.184
Indeed, the “ideological endorsement” and “philosophical imprimatur” that
attach to this sort of contribution make it an altogether different thing than an
individual contribution.185 Rather than serving as a symbolic expression,
reasoned the court, a party’s contribution is more like a substantive political
statement deserving of and requiring greater First Amendment protection.186
Because the majority found a “weightier” First Amendment right, the court
imposed a higher evidentiary burden on the state. It reasoned that the nature of
parties also affects the kind of reason the government must advance to justify
an intrusion on First Amendment rights.187 Citing Justice Thomas’s Colorado
Republican I concurrence, the court pointed out the logical weaknesses of the
anti-corruption rationale in the party-candidate context.188 Because of their
unity of purpose, it becomes difficult to imagine how a party could corrupt its
own candidate, making the state’s evidentiary challenge an even tougher one in
this context. The court also questioned the state’s anti-evasion rationale on
two grounds. First, the court believed that this rationale worked in a way that
burdened the free speech rights of parties to control the activities of someone
else.189 Secondly, it pointed to already existing Missouri statutes which outlaw
using parties or other political groups as conduits or means of circumventing
individual contribution limits.190 The court acknowledged that this regulation
might have an indirect attenuating effect on earmarking agreements (evasive
behavior), but concluded that this rationale is too frail to justify a limitation on
the substantial free speech rights of parties.191 Thus, the state failed to meet
the higher evidentiary burden applied by the Eighth Circuit and instead fell

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1072.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1072-73.
Id. at 1073.
Id.
Id.
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victim to a holding that labeled its espoused interests “novel,” “implausible”
and, therefore, unconstitutional in the party-candidate context.192
D. Gibson’s Dissent: Party-Candidate Unity is a Shifting Foundation; a
Contribution is Still a Contribution
Circuit Judge John R. Gibson concurred with the majority to the extent that
it classified this type of spending as a contribution.193 He also agreed that
Buckley and Colorado Republican provided guidance, but disagreed with the
court’s conclusion that party contributions were distinguishable from the
contributions described in Buckley and Shrink II. Thus, he also took issue with
the assertion that Shrink II was of limited value.194 Instead, he stated that
Shrink II reinforced Buckley’s “continuing vitality” in maintaining that
contributions impose less severe restrictions on First Amendment rights.195 In
addition, he claimed that Shrink II provided the standard the court must use.196
The basis for Judge Gibson’s dissent was his disagreement over the proper
characterization of the party-candidate relationship. He accused the majority
of going back and forth between different sides as it reached for a
description.197 For example, he pointed out that the majority acknowledged
“observable differences” between the two while simultaneously concluding
that they are “virtually indistinguishable.”198 On “this shifting foundation,”
stated Gibson, the majority’s entire opinion is constructed.199 Referring to
Colorado Republican I, Gibson claimed that there was no consensus on the
Supreme Court about this relationship.200 To wit, the Colorado Republican I
plurality rejected the argument that they are identical, “pointing out that
Congress treats parties and candidates differently by regulating contributions

192. Id. The court’s use of this language—basically the Shrink II test—caused the Missouri
Republican Party to argue in its opposition brief to the state’s petition for writ of certiorari that
the Court’s holding was merely a straightforward application of Shrink II. Brief in Opposition, at
12-13, Nixon v. Missouri Republican Party (No. 00-1136).
Shortly after the decision, a Missouri newspaper editorialized that the Missouri
Republican Party won on the law but lost on the politics. The reason for this was that following
the abolishment of party contribution limits, the Missouri Democratic Party contributed $2.6
million to its candidates, and the Missouri Republican Party contributed merely $600,000.
Editorial, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sep. 13, 2000, at B6.
193. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1074.
194. Id. at 1073.
195. Id. at 1074.
196. Id. Arguably, however, the majority used this standard, simply applying the test in a
different manner than Circuit Judge Gibson would have.
197. Id. Circuit Judge Gibson used the word “tergivisating.” Id.
198. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1074.
199. Id.
200. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

956

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:925

from one to the other.”201 Even though four justices signed their names to
concurrences which stressed the unity of party-candidate interests and
behavior, two more justices in the dissent identified a special danger that
parties will abuse the influence they have over candidates based on their power
to spend.202 Finally, Gibson claimed that Justice Kennedy’s conclusion, the
one he said the majority opinion was most similar to, fell short of the
majority’s conclusion that parties and candidates were virtually identical or
merged into one.203
Regardless of the nature of the relationship, Judge Gibson argued that the
Buckley analysis was framed in a way that leads to the conclusion that its
reference to contributions applies to all contributions, no matter what their
source.204 Buckley stated that the FECA “appl[ies] broadly to all phases of and
all participants in the election process.”205 In addition, claimed Gibson, it
discussed contributions and expenditures in a part of the opinion entitled
“general principles,” which indicated that the Court was intending to set forth
universally applicable concepts.206 Moreover, the Court’s use of the word
“group” in the paragraph directly following its discussion of political parties
indicated that it intended its description of contribution limits in that paragraph
to apply to all the groups referred to in the previous paragraph.207 Part of that
description included the notion that a contribution limit entailed only a
marginal restriction on free speech.208 Gibson argued these constructional
details would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court attaches constitutional
significance to the contribution-expenditure distinction in the political party
context.209 If this were so, the free speech rights of parties would be no greater
than the free speech rights of individuals. Under this framework, a
contribution is a contribution, and the same level of scrutiny is thus warranted.
Judge Gibson then applied the Shrink II test which upheld restrictions if
they were closely drawn to meet a sufficiently important interest.210 First, he
found the state’s anti-evasion rationale enough to meet the sufficiently
important interest test because the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
appearance of corruption can be rooted in the suspicion that individuals can
evade limits by using parties as a conduit.211 Second, he found that these
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204.
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207.
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211.

Id.
Id.
Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1075.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1075.
Id.
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1076.
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justifications were neither novel nor implausible because both anti-corruption
and anti-evasion rationales were used and considered plausible in previous
cases dealing with contribution limits.212 He stated the majority’s insistence on
evidentiary proof ran afoul of those previous decisions.213 Finally, finding the
limits to be “closely drawn” such that they would not suppress political
advocacy in Missouri, Judge Gibson stated he would have affirmed the district
court’s judgment.214
At the time of publication of this Note, the state’s petition for writ of
certiorari was pending before the Supreme Court. In the briefs submitted, each
side made its arguments in view of the Court’s upcoming Colorado Republican
II decision. The state argued that Lamb III bridges the gap between Shrink II
and Colorado Republican II by addressing the constitutionality of limits on
political party contributions.215 It offered the Supreme Court two choices: (1)
if the Court reverses the Tenth Circuit in Colorado Republican II, it argued the
Court should grant the writ, vacate the decision and remand back to the Eighth
Circuit with instructions to reconsider in light of the Court’s new precedent;216
(2) if the Court affirms the Tenth Circuit, the state argued that the need for
review would be even greater because the only existing constitutional
restriction on political party support under the federal scheme would be the
party contributions that the Eighth Circuit held unconstitutional.217 In
response, the Missouri Republican Party argued that Lamb III was simply a
straightforward application of Shrink II whereby the Eighth Circuit found that
the threat of a political party corrupting its candidates was both novel and
implausible.218 It claimed that the Court’s decision in Colorado Republican II
is not likely to create any reason to question the Eighth Circuit’s application of
Shrink II to limits on the amount of financial support provided by parties to

212. Id. For example, he cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) and California Med.
Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 197-98 (1981).
213. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1076.
214. Id. at 1077.
215. Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 19, Nixon v. Missouri Republican Party (No. 00-1136).
In addition, the state argued that the Eighth Circuit’s holding threatens a substantial disruption of
the statutory scheme (and, thus, upcoming congressional action) and that a conflict currently
exists among the courts on whether contribution limits are constitutional. Id. at 20, 24.
216. Id. at 24.
217. Id. at 25. In its Colorado Republican II brief of amici curiae, however, the state
indicated if the Court decides to affirm the Tenth Circuit’s decision to strike down limits on
coordinated expenditures, then all limits on political party support to candidates will effectively
come to an end. Brief of Amici Curiae State of Mo. at 8, Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (2001) (No. 00-191); see also supra note 135. Hence, it
would seem that the need for review would actually not be great were the Court to strike down
coordinated expenditure limits.
218. Brief in Opposition at 10, Nixon v. Missouri Republican Party (No. 00-1136).
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candidates.219 Thus, it concluded that the state’s petition for writ of certiorari
should be denied. It is doubtful that the Court will rule on the petition until it
hands down its Colorado Republican II decision.220
IV. ANALYSIS: DON’T SILENCE THE LAMB
Like Judge Gibson and the Lamb II district court, Missouri’s campaign
finance reformers put great stock in the contribution expenditure distinction
first explicated by the Supreme Court a quarter of a century ago.221 This
distinction has been greatly criticized, however, as this Note has already
indicated.222 The problem with the distinction is both a constitutional problem
and a political effects problem. The constitutional problem is that the rationale
for the distinction is questionable. As Chief Justice Burger suggested in
Buckley, the Court’s attempt to justify the distinction by identifying two
different communicative aspects of contributions, the moral support they
convey and the fact that they translate into communication, is flawed because
the end result of a contribution is often identical to the end result of an
expenditure.223 The political effects problem is evident in the process by
which money, which has been and will likely remain a constant in elections,
flows to less accountable sources of expenditures, like PACs, in order to avoid
the contribution caps.224
While the point of this analysis is not to deconstruct the Supreme Court’s
contribution expenditure distinction, it will begin by considering the weakness
of such categorization in the political party context. It will then discuss the
219. Id. at 12, 22. The party further argued that Missouri can provide no evidence that
political party contributions cause corruption or the appearance of corruption. Id. at 10. It also
claimed that a substantial question remains as to whether the spending at issue in the case was a
contribution as opposed to a coordinated expenditure. Id. at 18. In addition, the party claimed
that the current posture of the case, whereby the record is somewhat scant due to the district
court’s grant of summary judgment and the Eighth Circuit’s reversal of that grant, presents many
unresolved issues that would control the outcome of the case notwithstanding review by the
Supreme Court. Id. at 21.
220. There is good reason to believe the Court will rule on the petition for writ of certiorari on
the same day it hands down its Colorado Republican II decision, because that is precisely what it
did in two prior Missouri campaign finance cases, denying certiorari on the same day the
Colorado Republican I decision was handed down. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996); see also, LaPierre, Pandering to Public Fears,
supra note 112, at 700.
221. Brief for Appellee at 16, 23-31, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th
Cir. 2000) (No. 00-2686). In its brief, Missouri argued that Shrink II affirmed Buckley’s bright
line distinction between contributions and expenditures. Hence, the state believed that the fact
that political party contributions were the target of the legislation should have been dispositive.
222. See supra Part II B.2.b.
223. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 243-44.
224. See Sullivan, Against Reform, supra note 41, at 325-26.
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role of the modern political party in order to demonstrate that embracing the
political parties as a means to solve the present real and perceived campaign
finance problems is consistent not only with the First Amendment but also
with the political realities that face the United States today. The application of
this informed view of the political parties and their role in the electoral
process, as occurred by the majority in Lamb III, would increase accountability
in the political sphere and lessen the influence of secondary and tertiary
political actors like PACs. Additionally, it will be shown that the effects of
this idea may in fact serve the desires of the reformers even more completely
than the reformers’ regulations could, were they found to be constitutional.225
A.

The Tyranny of Labels: “Word Game” Jurisprudence

Even though the Supreme Court has claimed that the government’s label
does not control its analysis,226 the two labels at issue in the campaign finance
context almost always control both the Court’s level of scrutiny and its finding
regarding the constitutionality of any regulation of campaign spending.227
There are two primary criticisms of the contribution expenditure distinction.228
First, “it is difficult to accept the view that contributions do not measure the
intensity of support or that the quantity of communication does not increase
with the size of the contribution.”229 Second, as Justice Burger pointed out, the
nature of the speech, regardless of whether it is a contribution or an
expenditure, is arguably the same because the final product is so often the
same.230
The Buckley Court, however, ignored this second critique, choosing
instead to rest its justification for the distinction on the premise that limitations
of contributions affect only speech by another or “speech by proxy.”231 Justice
Burger called this an arbitrary limitation, whereby the Court imposed a flat
ceiling without focusing on the actual harm worked apart from the
limitation.232 Furthermore, he stated that under this framework, whether
speech is an impermissible contribution or a permissible expenditure turns not
225. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
226. “[W]e cannot allow the Government’s suggested labels to control our First Amendment
analysis.” Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604,
627 (1996).
227. See supra tbl. 1 and accompanying text (supporting the idea that these labels have
controlled the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence).
228. Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns
and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 83 (1987).
229. Id.
230. Id. For example, a television commercial carrying an election message could be the
product of either contributions from persons or groups to the candidate or independent
expenditures from persons or groups on behalf of the candidate.
231. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 243 (1976).
232. Id. at 244 n.6.
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on whether the speech is by proxy, but rather on whether the speech is
authorized by the candidate.233 Thus, the distinction is really one between
independent and authorized political activity.234 Calling this distinction
unrealistic, Burger concluded that the Court was engaging in a “word game”
by not recognizing that people contribute money to political actors and
activities “because they wish to communicate ideas, and [that] their
constitutional interest in doing so is precisely the same whether they or
someone else utters the words.”235
This “word game” critique has caused some to question whether the
distinction provides “a reliable barometer of the relative significance of the
first amendment values at stake” and whether it alone should trigger different
levels of scrutiny.236 “An individual[‘s] choice to have a message with which
he agrees prepared by professionals [to have another speak for him by proxy]
is no less speech” than the real speech (expenditures) that the Supreme Court
protects.237 Because of this, the conclusion that the distinction is flawed and
that the level of scrutiny should not differ seems warranted.238 One might,
however, point to the differing risks of corruption that accompany
contributions and expenditures, according to the Supreme Court, as support for
the distinction. FECA’s creators believed that large contributions create a
greater risk of quid pro quo corruption because contributions may be given
directly to candidates in hopes of securing a quid pro quo from the candidate
should he or she experience electoral success.239 Independent expenditures,
however, are indirect and for that reason would seem less susceptible to the
dangers of quid pro quo corruption, the primary justification accepted by the
Supreme Court for limiting political speech.240
Many reformers, however, “do not suggest that most contributions and
expenditures fall into the quid pro quo category.”241 Instead, they argue that
contributions exert a more subtle influence by increasing the access of
moneyed interests who, they claim, already have more than enough access.242
Thus, it would appear the limitation is, to some degree, an attempt to redress a
perceived generalized imbalance of power, rather than the actual practice of

233. Id. at 244.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. BeVier, Money and Politics, supra note 91, at 1063.
237. Id. at 1064.
238. Id. at 1063.
239. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
240. See supra Part II B.2.a (discussing the anti-corruption rationale).
241. BeVier, Money and Politics, supra note 91, at 1082-83.
242. Id. Professor BeVier makes this comment in her article. Further support for this idea is
found in journalist Elizabeth Drew’s first book on politics and money. ELIZABETH DREW,
POLITICS AND MONEY 59 (1983).
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exchanging money for votes.243 While justifications of this nature are seldom
articulated, it does seem clear, based on the state’s inability to produce any
evidence, that the quid pro quo corruption that most contribution limits aim to
address is more of a perception than a reality.244
Moving from the justifications to the effects, present political realities
demonstrate that the contribution expenditure distinction has produced a
campaign finance system far different from what reformers envisioned.245
According to Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan, Buckley has
produced a system in which candidates must contend with an unlimited
demand for funds because expenditures cannot be capped and a limited supply
of funds because contributions are capped.246 This increases the value of the
commodity (campaign money) such that candidates are constantly preoccupied
with fund-raising.247 As the professors relate, it is like allowing a starving man
unlimited trips to the buffet table, but forcing him to use a thimble-sized spoon
to serve himself.248 As with food, such constricted means are likely to create a
singular obsession with consumption.249 Because contribution caps remove the
possibility of large direct contributions, candidates must spend more time
chasing smaller contributions to satisfy their need for money.250 The perverse
effect of reform, then, is to increase the amount of time and energy that
modern candidates spend on fund-raising, thus decreasing the amount of time
and energy they spend on governing.251
Another theory advanced by Professors Issacharoff and Karlan to describe
the weaknesses of the present campaign finance structure is what they term the
“hydraulics of campaign finance reform.”252 Like water, they posited, political
money must go somewhere, and it is part of a broader ecosystem (the current
243. BeVier, Money and Politics, supra note 91, at 1082.
244. See LaPierre, First Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18, at 218. Professor LaPierre
claimed that Missouri’s 1994 campaign finance legislation pandered “to public perceptions about
the amorphous evils of ‘big money.’” One legislator even remarked to him that “perception is
more important than what’s real” in the campaign finance reform arena. Id.
245. See Nahra, supra note 228, at 83-84.
246. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1711 (1999). Professors Issacharoff and Karlan have both commented on
campaign finance reform both prior to and after this particular joint effort. See, e.g., Samuel
Issacharoff, Introduction: The Structures of Democratic Politics, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 593
(2000); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not By “Election” Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1173 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, Symposium: Defining Democracy for the Next Century: Loss and
Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291 (1997).
247. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 246, at 1711.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. Of course, this effect does not hold for the self-promoting superrich candidate, who
may, as the authors point out, be the least qualified to hold public office. Id.
252. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 246, at 1708-09.
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political landscape, which includes PACs, special interest groups, corporations,
soft money and independent expenditures).253 If money has the outcomedeterminative effect on campaigns that reformers identify, they reasoned, then
wealthy political operatives will continue to use it to influence outcomes
whatever the regulatory regime.254 This is especially true in a country that
guarantees free speech, equating money spent to create speech as speech.
When you apply this principle to a finance structure that limits contributions to
primary actors like candidates and parties, thus forcing money upstream to
secondary and tertiary actors like PACs, you get a system where candidates are
not only “perpetual fundraisers” but also more and more indebted to entities
like PACs and others who make independent expenditures.255
These effects only affirm what many have thought since day one: it is time
for the word game to end. At least with respect to contributions between
primary actors such as political parties and candidates, the contribution
expenditure distinction should be abolished. By refusing to accept the artificial
distinction between contributions and expenditures, the Eighth Circuit in Lamb
III held at bay the movement of money upstream, enabling it to remain within
entities that voters can hold accountable. This is a positive effect, as well as an
example that other jurisdictions, including the Supreme Court, should follow.
For, as the professors conclude: “[T]here are serious reasons to think we would
be better off if individuals and institutions who are entitled to advocate views
or express themselves were to do so through the mediating institutions of
broad-based political parties.”256
B.

The Modern Political Party: A Campaign-Centered Institution

In its brief, the state of Missouri implicitly argued that parties occupy the
same ground as PACs when it comes to their role in the political realm and the
freedoms associated with that role.257 Circuit Judge Gibson also argued in his
dissent that the Buckley court intended to lump political parties in with other
253. Id. See also generally Marshall, supra note 39 (discussing the unintended consequences
of campaign finance reform); Smith, supra note 40 (discussing the undemocratic consequences of
campaign finance reform); Sullivan, Against Reform, supra note 41 (discussing the substitution
effects of campaign finance reform). The meanings that the labels employed by each of these
scholars are meant to capture are essentially synonymous with the “hydraulic” principle described
in Issacharoff & Karlan.
254. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 246, at 1709.
255. Id. at 1736.
256. Id.
257. Brief for Appellee at 21-23, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir.
2000) (No. 00-2686). The state answered the Missouri Republican Party’s argument that a
candidate speaks for the party by pointing to a similar argument that was rejected in CalMed, that
a PAC is a mouthpiece for its parent organization. The state claimed that like a PAC and its
parent organization, parties are separate from their candidates and thus not virtual alter egos as
the court suggested. Id.
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“groups,” including PACs, when it discussed how contribution limits
operated.258 This comparison, that of parties to PACs, because it has played an
outcome-determinative role in courts’ constitutional analysis, has caused
commentators to speculate about whether the differences are differences in
degree or differences in kind.259 Before considering the modern political party
and the activities that set it apart from other groups, it is helpful to take a brief
look back at the role and development of the political parties in America.
America’s two major political parties have existed virtually since the
beginning of the republic.260 In an age lacking the easy means of
communication that exist today, the original parties found their niche by
developing institutional means for coordinating elections, by communicating
between electors and officials and by influencing and guiding legislative
behavior.261 They became an effective mechanism for aggregating individual
interests and resources into a coherent program.262 The local party structure
dominated and even provided an important social service function to members
of the local community.263 In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the welfare state
began to supplant the social service function performed by the parties. In
addition, the parties also became less involved in the process of selecting
nominees for office, causing commentators to decry the decline and weakness
of the political parties in America.264 Consequently, in the period just prior to
the FECA’s passage and the Buckley holding, party regulations were not a big
concern of the reformers.265 For this reason, both Congress in the FECA and
the Court in Buckley essentially ignored the parties in their analysis of the
constitutionality of various campaign finance reforms.266
Despite its failure to directly consider parties, Buckley, in addition to the
1979 amendments to the FECA, forged a different role for the political
parties—one that they appear to be flourishing in today.267 Today’s political
parties are national and statewide organizations that focus on providing
campaign services rather than distributing the spoils of local government
elections.268 Their new role has made the parties major players in the federal
258. Lamb III, 227 F.3d at 1075.
259. See Kurt D. Dykstra, Sending the Parties “PAC-ing”? The Constitution, Congressional
Control and Campaign Spending After Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Elections Commission, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1201, 1226 (1998) (concluding that the
differences are significant enough to be considered differences in kind).
260. Nahra, supra note 228, at 87.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 88-89.
264. Id. at 89-90; see also SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 19, at 4-5.
265. See Nahra, supra note 228, at 88-89.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 88.
268. See id.
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and state campaign process, where they are significant providers of campaign
services and campaign funds.269 This is despite being limited on both the
supply and demand side of contributions, because individuals are often limited
as to the amount they can contribute to parties and parties are often limited as
to the amount they can contribute to, or spend in cooperation with, candidates.
Limitations of this nature would suggest not only that parties are like PACs,
but also that the differences that do exist create an even greater risk of
corruption because the limitations are in some ways more severe than those on
PACs. A closer look at party behavior, however, especially with respect to the
campaign process, will demonstrate that parties and special interest groups like
PACs are distinguishable in a crucial way.
In his book Party Politics in America, Frank Sorauf identified five major
differences between political parties and other interest groups.270 The first
difference is the extent to which political parties pursue their activities through
the contesting of elections.271 The parties field candidates at every level.272
PACs can only support individuals already engaged in the process of
campaigning under the auspices of a party, making their involvement
secondary.273 The second difference is that parties must be broad and inclusive
to succeed.274 They cannot afford to be exclusive or to focus on a narrow
range of concerns because their goal is to attain the support of a majority of the
voting public.275 PACs, however, are typically the political arms of a narrow
special interest group that has involved itself in the political process solely to
benefit its own narrow special interest.276 The third difference is that political
parties operate solely in the political arena to effect political goals and
purposes.277 They are not economic actors, nor do they have as a goal the
advancement of non-political agendas, as many PACs and special interest

269. Id.
270. FRANK J. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 18-22 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS].
271. Id. at 18-19. In his article, Kirk Nahra argued that the political parties’ role in elections
is so important that they should be deemed state actors. Nahra, supra note 228, at 99.
272. Dykstra, supra note 259, at 1226.
273. Id.
274. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS, supra note 270, at 19.
275. Id. For example, the Missouri Republican Party (MRP) stated in its brief that its primary
goal is to take control of state government by electing republican candidates to statewide office to
implement republican policies and principles. To do so, the MRP targets races in which the
outcome is in doubt and party support might affect the result. In addition, the MRP provides
many candidates seed money and participates in recruiting and candidate development as a
tangible demonstration of party support. Brief for Appellant at 6-10, Missouri Republican Party
v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-2686).
276. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS, supra note 270, at 19-20.
277. Id. at 19.
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groups do.278 The fourth difference is that political parties persist over time
whereas special interest groups tend to move into and out of existence,
depending on the success of their particular agenda.279 Parties are therefore
able to fulfill a stabilizing function in American political life that special
interest groups do not contribute to.280 Finally, the fifth difference is that
political parties serve as cues and reference points for voters as they select
issues and candidates who they might otherwise know little about.281 Special
interest groups cannot serve this function because their selection is more
arbitrary, often based not on a policy stance, but rather on who is likely to
win.282 Sometimes, special interest groups give money to candidates from both
parties in order to hedge their bets and ensure themselves some access to
political actors regardless of who wins.283
Many of these differences between PACs and parties suggest a shared
identity between the modern political party and its candidates, the extent of
which was hotly disputed in Lamb III.284 The question is whether the party and
its candidates are in effect one. While it is easy to see that the two are not
identical, it is apparent both from the concurring opinions in Colorado
Republican I and the majority opinion in Lamb III that the level of
interdependence is great enough to conclude that the relationship warrants a
different kind of First Amendment analysis. As one commentator noted, a
political party is like a candidate’s extended family.285 They are subdivisions
of an indivisible whole such that neither can function without the other.286
This is especially true when examining the parties. Were it not for candidates,
the parties would clearly be out of business. Although it is not as evident that
the candidates need a party to function, virtually all candidates choose to ally
themselves with the parties and lean on them for the many benefits they
provide, demonstrating that the relationship is more than a mere symbiotic one
between separate entities.287 Indeed, by providing access to a preexisting
network of supporters and helping with start-up and maintenance costs, parties
are typically necessary vehicles for candidates to achieve electoral victory.288
In that regard, parties have become essential to the orderly functioning of

278. Id. at 19-20.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 20.
281. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS, supra note 270, at 20-21.
282. Dykstra, supra note 259, at 1230.
283. Id.
284. See supra Part III.B and Part III.C (discussing the two opinions in Missouri Republican
Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2000)).
285. Dykstra, supra note 259, at 1231.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1234.
288. Id.
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democratic governance.289 The end result of the interdependence and
mutuality of interests between parties and candidates is that it is very difficult
for corruption to exist in the party-candidate context. Without engaging in
either word or metaphysical games in order to properly categorize the spending
and relationships that characterize this context, it seems fair, based on the wellrecognized qualities of the modern political party, to make this conclusion.
C. The Effects of Removing Party Limits: More or Less Corruption?
It is well established that the only justification allowed by the Constitution
for limiting the political speech contained in a contribution is the prevention of
corruption or the appearance of corruption.290 The reformers have other goals
as well, including leveling the electoral playing field to create political equality
and lowering the overall amount of money spent on campaigns.291 Based on
the “hydraulic principle” identified above, it is debatable to what degree the
overall amount of money spent on campaigns can be regulated or in some other
manner restrained. By comparing the present FECA-based system employed
by many states, including Missouri, with a system that puts less restrictions on
primary actors like candidates and political parties, one will discover that a
system that does not restrict parties is superior to a system that treats them like
narrow special interest groups or individuals. The political parties actually
provide a means through which to accomplish the reformers’ goals.292 Striking
down limits on parties to support candidates not only reaffirms constitutional
principles, it assists the reformers’ goals of minimizing corruption, developing
an open political system where candidates can compete on a level playing field
and providing for public disclosure of spending activity.293 Striking down
political party limits is consistent, not so much with the reformers’ idealized
notion of what the American political system should look like, but rather with
political realities that exist today based on all of the factors that bear on the
systems’ objective reality.
The campaign finance system involves a choice between options. The
FECA-based option currently being employed by the federal government and
many states tends to regulate accountable actors like candidates and political
parties more than unaccountable actors like PACs and activities like issue
advocacy. Noted constitutional scholar Kathleen Sullivan identified the
“upstream” effects of restricting some political speech through contribution

289. Id. at 1232.
290. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
291. See, e.g., Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 649 (Stevens J., and Ginsburg J.,
dissenting).
292. Nahra, supra note 228, at 57.
293. Id.
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caps as “substitution effects.”294 The substitutes she identified (PAC spending,
soft money, issue advocacy) take the place of the political money that would
otherwise go to candidates or political parties.295 The current system thus
creates incentives to shift political spending away from candidates and parties
to secondary organizations which cannot be held accountable by voters.296
Because these substitution effects cannot be constitutionally limited, the
current system also creates a safe harbor for political behavior that is perverse
from the standpoint of uninhibited political debate.297 For example, the
Missouri Republican Party alleged in its brief that a system which forces it to
make independent expenditures instead of coordinated or direct contributions
is less effective because it requires the party to engage in negative advertising
and prevents it from presenting a united ticket to the state.298 The kind of
“issue advocacy” engaged in by special interest groups, a political behavior
that falls totally outside the control of the candidate or the party, is another
example of a perverse effect. The advantages that wealthy candidates have
over non-wealthy ones and that incumbents have over cash-starved challengers
are further examples.299 Based on the negative effects of the present reform
regime, a better solution in this choice between options would begin with the
abolishment of contribution caps between political parties and candidates.
The Eighth Circuit struck down party contribution limits because it found
them unconstitutional. There are good reasons to conclude that the court’s
decision was also smart policy. Candidates and political parties provide a
mediating influence in electoral politics because of their shared need to steer a
middle course to gain or retain office.300 Single-issue interest groups have no
such influence on the political realm. Instead, they divide and conquer.301
Political money will be spent no matter what.302 By keeping it at the level of
candidates and parties, both of whom must engage in the give and take of
coalitional politics, stake out positions across a variety of issues, and answer to
voters, the removal of party limits minimizes the role of substitution effects.303
In addition, this process may reduce the overall effect of money on campaigns
by keeping it at a level where it can be better moderated and controlled.304
294. Sullivan, Against Reform, supra note 41, at 325-26. See also supra notes 39 & 40
(discussing different formulations of the same idea).
295. Sullivan, Against Reform, supra note 41, at 325-26.
296. Id. at 326.
297. Id.
298. Brief for Appellant at 12, Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir.
2000) (No. 00-2686).
299. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 246, at 1714.
300. Id.
301. See SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS, supra note 270, at 19-20 and accompanying text.
302. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 246, at 1708-09.
303. Id. at 1714.
304. Id.
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This was the conclusion of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Wisconsin
Campaign Finance Reform.305 Observing that independent expenditures fueled
by narrow interest groups and individuals were increasing, leaving candidates
less in control of their campaigns, the Commission saw substantial benefits to
having campaigns centered on candidates and political parties.306 This,
however, does not answer the question posed above: Whether more or less
corruption will inhere in a system that favors candidates and political parties
compared to the special interests advantaged under most current reform
agendas?
While candidates and political parties are not identical, their common
electoral interests and coinciding common incentives to steer a middle course
minimize the corruption risk, making a policy position that favors them better
than all the other options. The funding gap created by contribution caps
funnels money to PACs and special interest groups whose political behavior is
more likely to raise the specter of corruption or at least pollution.307 Because
the public tends to view the activities of such groups, due to their narrow
interests, with more skepticism than they view candidates acting within the
realm of party politics, it would appear that limits on parties have the effect of
eroding the public’s confidence in the purity of the election process.308
Because of this, some have suggested that money that flows through political
parties to candidates is the cleanest money in politics.309 Alluding to the Tenth
Circuit’s recent use of the “solution to pollution is dilution” maxim, these
advocates argue, quite convincingly, that the aggregation of money in parties
will diffuse any real or perceived undue influence that might arise from a
contribution made by an individual source.310
The reformers, however, are likely to counter that “conduit” corruption is
the real threat when it comes to removing party limits.311 This refers to the use
of the parties by individuals or special interest groups as a conduit, enabling
them to circumvent any limits that exist on the direct contributions of these
groups. In response to this argument, one might point to the fact that it is
illegal under the FECA and most FECA-based systems to do this and adequate
disclosure provisions enable policing to occur.312 Alternatively, some would
argue that conduit corruption is not a real threat and that all contribution caps,

305. Id. See Governor’s Blue-Ribbon Commission on Campaign Finance Reform, State of
Wisconsin 43, available at http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/campaign%5Freform/final.htm.
306. Id. See also Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 246, at 1715-16.
307. Amicus Brief, Committee for Party Renewal at 4, Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (No. 95-489).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 16.
310. Id. at 17-18.
311. Briffault, Comment, supra note 4, at 115-16.
312. See Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 647 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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including those on individuals and special interest groups, should be
abolished.313 Under such a system, two things would happen: first, aggressive
disclosure would enable voters to become aware of the likelihood of undue
influence themselves; and second, money would flow back to the primary,
moderating influences of candidates and parties.314 While this Note does not
aim to address this possibility, it would seem logical to conclude that giving
the parties a bigger role in the channeling of money from contributors to
candidates reduces the possibility of corruption in a more effective manner
than any other constitutional alternative.
Not only would the removal of party limits, whether by the courts or by the
legislature, minimize corruption, it is clear that encouraging parties to become
a preferred vehicle for contributions from the public would serve a number of
positive public policy ends, including the following: it would enable candidates
to run effective campaigns that they can control;315 it would diminish
challenger concerns about fund-raising, reducing the advantage currently held
by both incumbents and independently wealthy candidates;316 it would thus
contribute to the leveling of the electoral playing field, helping satisfy the oftrepeated desire of reformers to create political equality;317 it would diminish
the impact of PACs and other non-accountable special interest groups;318 and it
would strengthen the parties’ ability to achieve policy coherence and mobilize
majorities in Congress.319 The removal of party limits might, however, entail
some costs, and the reformers’ concern about the increased use of the parties as
a conduit to get around other restrictions is probably the chief one.320
Decisions about the campaign finance system must occur with an eye toward
political realities, though, including the freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment.321 Because of the close relationship between parties and

313. See Sullivan, Against Reform, supra note 41, at 326; Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note
246, at 1736-37.
314. Id.
315. Nahra, supra note 228, at 107.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 108-09.
319. Amicus Brief, Committee for Party Renewal at 3, Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (No. 95-489).
320. Justice Thomas in Colorado Republican I and the Eighth Circuit in Lamb III both
recognized the possibility of increased conduit corruption absent party limits, but both concluded
that conduit corruption can and should be addressed in other ways. Both pointed out that the
government is still free to restrict individual contributions to a party and require disclosure.
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit demonstrated that the employment of party contribution limits to
stem the tide of conduit corruption restricts the free speech rights of parties to control the
activities of someone else. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
321. See supra Part II.A (discussing the impact of the First Amendment on campaign finance
reform).
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candidates and the unique role of parties in the election process, it is
reasonable to conclude that, where accompanied by an aggressive disclosure
regime, a finance system that favors the parties involves less risk of corruption
than any other system that might be enacted under our Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated why political party freedoms should not be
sacrificed at the altar of campaign finance reform. While Missouri’s reformers
certainly meant well, the unconstitutional nature and unintended side effects of
a campaign finance system that restrains a party’s ability to support its
candidates precluded their success. Missouri Republican Party v. Lamb was
certainly a victory for advocates of free speech. But, in truth, the reformers did
not lose much here. In fact, the removal of contribution caps with respect to
political parties is a policy choice that offers many benefits, not the least of
which is stemming the tide of money flowing to non-accountable political
actors and activities. In addition, a world without party limits may actually be
one in which the reality and perception of corruption is less, assuming other
means are used to prevent any use of the parties as a means to circumvent other
limits.
Very soon the Supreme Court will issue its decision in Colorado
Republican II.322 This will certainly give the Court an opportunity to provide
more clarity to its campaign finance jurisprudence, especially as it relates to
the party-candidate relationship. Unlike Colorado Republican I, it does not
appear that the Court will be able to sidestep the “broader” constitutional
questions that it neglected to rule on last time. It is presently unclear whether
the Court will decide to finally abolish the contribution expenditure distinction
and if so, whether they will do so in a manner that finds limits on both or limits
on neither acceptable.323 Perhaps, the Court will retain the distinction but
exempt political parties from contribution limits based on their unique identity,
finding a weightier First Amendment right, much like the Lamb III court did.
One can only hope that the Court will not send the political parties to the

322. On February 28, 2000, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000) (Colorado Republican II). The Court’s opinion will likely be
issued by the end of June of 2001. U.S. High Court Considers Party Spending Limits, REUTERS,
available at http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/s/20010228/courtpolitics.html. See supra Part II.
C (discussing this case and its likely impact on the disposition of Missouri Republican Party v.
Lamb).
323. LaPierre, First Amendment Hurdle, supra note 18, at 239-40 (speculating about which
way the Buckley tree will fall).
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slaughter. Because if they do, it is clear that the campaign finance system in
this country will become even more messy than it already is.
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